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Human beings suffer,
They torture one another,
They get hurt and get hard.
No poem or play or song
Can fully right a wrong
Inflicted and endured.
The innocent in gaols
Beat on their bars together.
A hunger-striker's father
Stands in the graveyard dumb.
The police widow in veils
Faints at the funeral home.
History says, Don't hope
On this side of the grave.
But then, once in a lifetime
The longed-for tidal wave
Of justice can rise up.
And hope and history rhyme.
So hope for a great sea-change
On the far side of revenge.
Believe that a further shore
Is reachable from here.
Believe in miracles
And cures and healing wells.
Call miracle self-healing;
The utter, self-revealing
Double-take of feeling.
If there's fire on the mountain
Or lightning and storm
And a god speaks from the sky
That means someone is hearing
The outcry and the birth-cry
Of new life at its term.
—Seamus Heaney
from The Cure at Troy
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I. Introduction
"I accept the report as it is, with all its imperfections, as an aid that the TRC has given to
us to help reconcile and build our nation." So said South African President Nelson
Mandela at the October 29, 1998 ceremony at which Archbishop Desmond Tutu,
Chairperson of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), handed
over the Commission's Final Report.' Mandela went on to observe that:
"the wounds of the period of repression and resistance are too deep to have
been healed by the TRC alone, however well it has encouraged us along
that path. Consequently, the Report that today becomes the property of
our nation should be a call to all of us to celebrate and to strengthen what
we have done as a nation as we leave our terrible past behind us forever."
With characteristic grace and style, Mandela set the tone for a ceremony that was mired
in controversy and could have been a disaster - for the TRC as well as for his party, the
African National Congress (ANC). While Mandela took the moral high road in accepting
and publicly releasing a report that the ANC had launched an eleventh-hour court
interdict to block, his heir-apparent, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, along with the
several other senior ANC officeholders, did not bother to make an appearance at the
ceremony.2 The ANC was not alone in its indignation, nor were its leaders alone in
boycotting the ceremony. Naysayers from the right - from the National Party (NP) to the
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to the Freedom Front (FF) - all found fodder in the Final
Report for public denunciation.3 For its part, the Democratic Party (DP) was content to
focus its admonitions on the reactions of its political opponents, rather than on the TRC
itself.4 Meanwhile, Tutu, ever the proselytizer of truth and reconciliation, intoned: "Let
the waters of healing flow from Pretoria today as they flowed from the altar in Ezekiel's
vision, to cleanse our land, its people, and to bring unity and reconciliation." And so the
spectacle of the hand-over of the TRC's Final Report epitomized in many ways the
politics that characterized the TRC process as a whole.
Much has already been written about truth commissions in comparative perspective, and
about the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in particular.1 This
paper assumes some familiarity on both counts. Truth commissions, it seems, are in
vogue. Priscilla Hayner, an independent researcher and noted scholar of truth
commissions, has identified 20-odd variations of this kind of mechanism in the past 24
years.6 Of those, some are more noteworthy than others. The South African model is one
of the most thought-through, well-funded, best-staffed mechanisms of its kind, and the
share of media attention it has received is unrivaled. It is also the most ambitious truth
commission to date, with a mandate that includes taking measures to restore dignity to
victims and granting amnesty to eligible perpetrators of gross human rights violations, in
addition to establishing as complete a picture as possible about the nature, causes, and
extent of gross human rights violations that took place within and outside of South
Africa's borders between 1960-94.' The TRC's relative success or failure, therefore,
offers significant indicators vis-a-vis the extent to which truth commissions will have
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staying power as a tool for future transitioning societies trying to come to grips with past
abuses.
The rationale for this position is based on the assumption that, if truth commissions
collectively are perceived to be little more than warm and fuzzy exercises signifying
nothing, and they fail to produce concrete positive results, those assuming power in
transitioning societies will be less willing to countenance such mechanisms, regardless of
how strenuously those who were responsible for atrocities under the former dispensation
might lobby for them.8 By the same token, Western donors will consider the track record
of previous truth commissions, and in the event of disappointing results, they would be
less inclined to fund similar endeavors in the future. Even the prospect of lukewarm
results might not be adequate to stave off intervention from the new International
Criminal Court (ICC), which will doubtless weigh in on questions regarding impunity.
There is no clear roadmap as to how these judgments ultimately will be made. Hayner
has noted the need for international standards for credible, effective truth commissions.9
Such standards, if and when they are agreed, could also serve as benchmarks for
postmortem quality assessments. Drawing from and expanding on such benchmarks, this
paper assesses the South African TRC process, which passes, though not with flying
colors. While it is still several generations too early to judge the TRC's ultimate success
or failure, it would be irresponsible not to step back and look at its broader implications.
In so doing, it should be emphasized that the conclusions drawn are, of necessity, of a
preliminary nature.
In that vein then, this paper attempts to add value to the existing scholarship by
examining the innovations in the South African model, whose architects benefited from
lessons learned from the prior experiences of other countries with such mechanisms. It
also considers a variety of ways in which the South African political backdrop informed
the TRC process, and vice-versa. The Commission was established as an independent
body that would operate free fifom external political interference - whether from the
government, political parties, or other influential actors. But it was born of political
compromise and, by the very nature of its mandate, it remained to the end, like any truth
commission worth its salt, an inherently political body. The high-stakes politics of the
TRC's endgame are particularly illustrative of this reality.
On the assumption that truth commissions will outlast the fad stage, the paper
extrapolates on some of the lessons learned from the South African experiment with
truth-telling and accountability. It is worth conceding up front, however, that, in South
Africa at least, the TRC's ultimate success or failure will depend greatly on two key
aspects beyond its control. The first concerns the extent to which the TRC's
recommendations are acted upon, by the government and the institutions that fostered a
climate conducive to the systematic and gross abuse of human rights under apartheid.
The outcome will boil down largely to a function of political will on the part of the
government, which will play an enforcing role vis-a-vis the TRC's recommendations.
Doing so will also entail a difficult resource allocation balancing act between urgent
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claims for basic quality of life improvements for South Africa's previously-disadvantaged
majority (e.g., water, low-cost housing, job creation) against many of the longer-term
objectives embodied in the Report's recommendations (e.g., human rights training). How
individual reparations for victims of gross human rights violations will fit into this
equation remains to be seen. On an even more nebulous level, the long-term prospects of
success ultimately will rely on individual South Africans - because it is on the individual
level that reconciliation takes place and the seeds for societal transformation are planted.
Here, political leadership, as Mandela has so aptly demonstrated, can play an immensely
powerful role.
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II. The Benefits of Learning from Others' Mistakes.
Timothy Garton Ash has identified three main paths by which countries have come to
terms with human rights abuses by their former governments: trials, purges, or history
lessons, and "the choice of path, and the extent to which each can be followed," he said,
"depends on the character of the preceding dictatorship, the manner of the transition, and
the particular situation of the succeeding democracy."10 Among many other advantages,
those in South Africa who planned, negotiated, and worked on the TRC had the benefit of
being in a position to learn from the experiences of several other countries which had
enacted amnesties, truth commissions, and other mechanisms to deal with their past. As
negotiations in South Africa progressed - from secret talks between Mandela and former
President P.W. Botha, to the unbanning of the ANC, the return and indemnification of
exiles, and the release of political prisoners, to "talks about talks" and the multiparty talks
leading to the Interim Constitution - the relevance of these issues became increasingly
apparent."
Ash cites Tina Rosenberg's distinction that, "in Latin America, repression was deep, in
Central Europe it was broad," as helpful in explaining the different paths chosen in those
respective regions.12 South Africans contemplating their own path might reasonably
have questioned how South Africa fit into this paradigm, as repression in apartheid South
Africa was both deep ("there was a group of people who were clearly victims - tortured,
murdered, or... 'disappeared'") and broad (whereas atrocities elsewhere were usually
committed against a minority, in South Africa it was the majority black population which
suffered the most and "was kept down by millions of tiny Lilliputian threads of everyday
mendacity, conformity and compromise").13
Although a number of countries had successfully made a transition from authoritarian
rule to democracy, no country had experienced a system akin to apartheid, which the
international community had singled out in its opprobrium, labeling it a crime against
humanity. So negotiators would return, time and again, to the particularities of the South
African context. Minister for Water Affairs Kader Asmal, who played an influential role
in the early thinking about the TRC, reflected at the time that:
"there is no prototype that can be automatically used in South Africa. We
will be guided, to a greater or lesser extent, by experiences elsewhere,
notably in those countries that managed to handle this highly sensitive -
even dangerous - process with success. But at the end of the day, what is
most important is the nature of our particular political settlement and how
best we can consolidate the transition in South Africa."14
In the view of Graeme Simpson, Executive Director of the Centre for the Study of
Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), Latin American examples were primarily
instructive as "examples of failure rather than success," and it was with a view "to
redressing the errors made in these countries, as well as to acknowledging the differences
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in the unique South African context," that NGOs such as the CSVR submitted
recommendations on the TRC legislation."
Long before these issues were on the radar screen of mainstream South Africa, non-
governmental organizations, like the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA),
Justice in Transition, and the CSVR were establishing contacts with practitioners and
intellectuals from other countries with experience in or expertise about truth commissions
or similar mechanisms." Under the leadership of Alex Boraine, who would later be
appointed as Deputy Chairperson of the TRC, Justice in Transition sought out insights
and lessons learned from prior truth commissions, and facilitated brainstorming,
networking and lobbying efforts for some 30 South African NGOs." According to
Boraine, a healthy consultative dynamic developed, largely because "those in the human
rights community welcomed the opportunity to do something^/- rather than something
against. For the future."18 Based on this extensive "homework," South African civil
society was instrumental, not only in shaping the public debate about the need for some
king of accountability mechanism, but ultimately in the crafting of the TRC legislation,
as well. Boraine and company were responsible for the first working draft of the
legislation."
The ANC also had the benefit of its own experience, having appointed the Skweyiya and
Motsuenyane Commissions in 1991 and 1993, respectively, to investigate allegations of
torture, killings, and other abuses at ANC detention camps. Indeed, following up the
concept first mooted in Kader Asmal's inaugural lecture as Professor of Human Rights
Law at the University of the Western Cape, and in response to the Motsuenyane
Commission's recommendation that it do so, the ANC publicly apologized to its victims,
but also went a step further in calling publicly for "a truth commission to investigate all
human rights violations, including those committed by apartheid agents."20
The NP, meanwhile, had counted on being able to indemnify the apartheid security forces
from prosecution in the new dispensation, and indeed fought for a blanket amnesty until
the last moment. The issue was a deal-breaker for the NP. The ANC was sensitive to the
danger in "pushing the other side into a corner where the only option out is to fight" and
felt the need to "preempt what was a very real possibility of a right-wing insurrection."21
Jose Zalaquett had used the Argentine case study to reinforce this "sustainability" lesson:
"It is worse for a political leader who enjoys legitimacy to have to go back on what he
proposed than to achieve less than would have been ideal. In Argentina the president
aimed too high. As a result he faced a backlash and had to put the stamp of a democratic
president on ugly impunity measures."22 And so the ANC agreed to the NP's demand
that there be some kind of amnesty. Objecting in principle to self-amnesty, however, the
ANC was savvy enough to save for a later day the battle to balance its amnesty
concession with provisions that would help meet the needs of those who had suffered
under apartheid.23 At the eleventh hour, then, those who were negotiating South Africa's
Interim Constitution agreed to tag onto it a postamble, whose formulation left it to a
democratically-elected parliament to work out the precise mechanism under which an
amnesty regime would be implemented.2*
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Without going into too much detail on a subject that will doubtless be examined in
forthcoming books on this subject, it is worthwhile to reflect on some additional
examples of how lessons learned in other parts of the world were applied to the TRC."
In doing so, it is useful to keep in mind the constraints and advantages South Africa faced
in putting them into practice, as well as the extent to which the intended outcomes had
practical effect.
Problems with Blanket Amnesty
Consider, for example, the lesson on blanket amnesty that Jose Zalaquett, who served on
the Chilean National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, shared with his South
African interlocutors at one of the pre-TRC consultative conferences referred to above:
"One should begin by reconciling oneself to the idea that amnesties are possible.
However, several things should first take place:
• amnesty should possibly serve the ultimate purposes of reparation and prevention;
• it should be based on the truth, or one cannot really know what the pardon or
amnesty is for;
• there should ideally be an acknowledgement of that truth; and
• the amnesty must be approved democratically in the sense that it must be the will
of the nation to forgive."26
Zalaquett's advice struck a chord with those in the audience who would become the
architects of the TRC. The compelling need to establish the truth - and an
acknowledgment of that truth - was seen as particularly important for victims. Out of
such concerns was born the most significant innovation associated with the TRC: rather
than offering a blanket amnesty to all perpetrators of gross human rights violations under
the ancien regime, individuals would have to apply for amnesty for their politically-
motivated acts, omissions, or offenses, and that amnesty would be conditional, among
other things, on full disclosure. The Final Report explains this key innovation thus:
"No other state had combined this quasi-judicial power with the
investigative tasks of a truth-seeking body. More typically, where
amnesty was introduced to protect perpetrators from being
prosecuted for the crimes of the past, the provision was broad and
unconditional, with no requirement for individual application or
confession of particular crimes. The South African format had the
advantage that it elicited detailed accounts from perpetrators and
institutions, unlike commissions elsewhere which have received
very little cooperation from those responsible for past abuses."2'
Harvard Law professor Martha Minnow has succinctly captured the logic of this
innovation: the legislation "turns the promise of amnesty, wrested from political
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necessity, into a mechanism for advancing the truth-finding process."21 Furthermore, for
those not already in the dock, the carrot of amnesty is coupled with the stick of possible
prosecution for those who either do not come forward to apply for amnesty; or are
unsuccessful in doing so, according to one or more of the conditions set forth in the Act.2*
ANC Member of Parliament Willie Hofmeyr, who was one of the key negotiators of the
Act, has explained that the requirement for individual rather than group amnesty
applications was intended in part to "undermine the solidarity of the security forces," who
would otherwise conspire to conceal the truth.30 A certain degree of uncertainty amongst
perpetrators about who had come forward and what they said could help provide a
stronger incentive for perpetrators to apply for amnesty. That the deadline for amnesty
applications came well before amnesty hearings had been concluded, it was hoped, would
heighten this uncertainty.
In reality, the threat of prosecution as incentive to come forward had mixed results. For
starters, the threat of civil suits was never particularly credible. There is a two- to three-
year statute of limitations for most civil claims in South Africa. Furthermore, most South
African victims cannot afford costly legal expenses associated with bringing a civil suit,
and in many cases, the facts of the case, including the perpetrators' identities, were not
known. As long as the perpetrators kept their code of silence, it would stay that way.
Where there was credible threat of prosecution, results were more favorable: The state
pulled out all the stops in the criminal trial of notorious South African Police (SAP)
Vlakplaas hit-squad commander Eugene de Kock. In August 1995, de Kock was
convicted of 89 charges, ranging from murder to fraud, and was sentenced to two life
terms plus 212 years. (De Kock applied for amnesty for these crimes in March 1996.) In
the process, De Kock implicated several ranking SAP officers and former cabinet
officials. Many of those implicated subsequently applied for amnesty. A similar
dynamic, it was hoped, would develop in the amnesty process. As Lyn Graybill points
out, while the Act "disallows court use of confessions given before the Amnesty
Committee as evidence, confessions may nevertheless alert attorneys general to the
culprits in unsolved cases, and they may then prosecute them on the strength of their own
investigations."31 In this way, several mid-level police officers who applied for amnesty
for firing indiscriminately into a crowd of protesters in 1992 "incentivized" General
Johan van der Merwe to apply for amnesty, as the one who gave the order. Van der
Merwe, in turn, implicated two cabinet level officials, and later also implicated former
President P.W. Botha in the 1988 bombing of the headquarters of the South African
Council of Churches.
Meanwhile, however, in 1995, then-KwaZulu-Natal Attorney General Tim McNally
botched the prosecution of former Defense Minister Magnus Malan and 16 other top
officers of the South African Defense Force (SADF), who had been charged with
organizing hit squad activity that resulted in the 1987 murder of thirteen people in
KwaMukutha. As Ash points out, in the aftermath of the Malan trial, the threat of
prosecution lost credibility, and "without that stick, the carrot of amnesty is useless."32 It
comes as no surprise, then that the amnesty-for-truth exercise yielded more fruit from
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among the ranks of the former SAP, where the code of silence had effectively been
broken - and threat of prosecution was more credible - than it did with the former SADF.
The logical conclusion of a conditional amnesty is that if the conditions for amnesty are
not met, prosecution is possible, if not probable. It therefore came as something of a
surprise when, in the aftermath of the handover of the Final Report, the issue of a general
amnesty once again raised its head. Journalist Max Du Preez pointed out the irony in
hearing, "the very same arguments that I heard three years ago against the establishment
of a truth commission," used by ANC members in support of a blanket amnesty: "Let's
forget the past... this will only divide our nation; it will be bad for reconciliation; it will
lead to violence."33 The political motivations and implications of this development are
discussed in greater detail later in the paper. In the meantime, it is worth pondering the
extent to which South Africa really did benefit from the Latin American "lesson" on
amnesty, given the notion's resurrection. What are the implications for future truth
commissions? The short answer is that all amnesties are imperfect, even conditional
amnesties, and the politically-expedient pull of blanket amnesties should never be
underestimated.
Need for Robust Investigatory Powers
South Africa was not the first country to encounter difficulty in breaking the code of
silence of the security forces. Commenting about the obstacles faced by the Chilean
Truth Commission, Zalaquett noted that, "while witnesses and possible perpetrators were
invited to testify," they could not be forced to do so; "subpoena powers would have been
an effective tool."34 Simpson echoed this concern, noting that, the considerable
limitations on that Chilean Commission's investigative powers meant, in practical effect,
that it was therefore unable "to effectively elicit the necessary information about the
'disappeared'... (or) attribute individual responsibility for past human rights abuses."3'
Given that South Africa's political leadership and top military brass had long operated
according to the principle of "plausible deniability," and, as former TRC Executive
Secretary Paul Van Zyl has pointed out, many of the political crimes to be investigated
were "committed by highly skilled operatives trained in the art of concealing their crimes
and destroying evidence," it became clear that the TRC, if it was going to have any
success in fulfilling its mandate, was going to need ample investigative muscle.36 And so
the drafters introduced the innovation of a permanent Investigative Unit and provided for
a number of specific investigative powers, including the powers of subpoena, search, and
seizure.
Under Section 29 of the Act, for example, the TRC could subpoena a person to appear
before it and answer questions relevant to a particular investigation. Thematic hearings
of this nature included inquiries into the Vlakplaas (hit squad) operations; violence
perpetrated by the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB); the role of security police in
KwaZulu and Natal; the Mandela United Football Club; and the apartheid state's
chemical and biological warfare program. As further remedy, Section 32 of the Act lays
out robust search and seizure powers. Anticipating problems associated with the widely
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reported destruction of sensitive documents by the previous government, the TRC's
mandate also includes the requirement to "determine what articles have been destroyed
by any person in order to conceal violations of human rights or acts associated with
political objectives.""
In practice, the TRC had difficulty exercising its enhanced investigatory muscle. The
Investigation Unit was hampered both by a lack of policy direction in the early phase, in
addition to delayed receipt of funding. "The fact that public hearings were launched in
mid-April 1996, before the Investigation Unit was fully established and prior to the
formulation of any policy regarding the selection of matters for public hearings," is
testament to this reality.38 That there would be a political imperative to move
expeditiously in holding human rights violations hearings is understandable. But this
impulse, however well-intentioned, was short-sighted. Piers Pigou, a former investigator
with the Unit, has said that "not nearly enough has been done to uncover the past," in part
because the Investigation Unit was "plagued by organizational, managerial, and
bureaucratic problems."'9
Subsequent reorganizations allowed the Investigation Unit to assume a more proactive
role, though difficulties remained, and it encountered a great deal of resistance, in
particular, in attempting to access information from the government. The Unit had
agreed, somewhat naively, to the use of "nodal" (liaison) points through which all
requests for information and responses were channeled between it and the South African
Police Service (SAPS) and the South African National Defense Force (SANDF). But
instead of serving to facilitate access to relevant information, appointed officials in those
agencies often played more of censoring role.
TRC Commissioner Dumisa Ntsebeza, the head of the Investigation Unit, has said that, in
retrospect, he regrets that the TRC did not used its search and seizure powers more
effectively: "Consciously or unconsciously, we imposed our own constraints. We did
not want to upset the apple cart, and we wanted to give those within the regime a
chance.'"10 Among other things, the early flexing of the TRC's enhanced investigative
muscle would have sent a strong signal and could have brought significant pressure to
bear on perpetrators who were sitting on the fence. Lamenting this missed opportunity,
Simpson said: "It's about showing your teeth early in the process."41 The failure to adopt
a more robust approach - early on - in exercising its powers of search, seizure and
subpoena, is linked to the perception on the part of many perpetrators that the threat of
prosecution lacked credibility in that both factors emboldened the alleged perpetrators to
adopt an arrogant and defiant posture towards the TRC and the amnesty process. This
approach was not confined to the security forces. In 1996, Mangosuthu Buthelezi
publicly announced that the IFP would not cooperate with the TRC, and IFP members
were discouraged from applying for amnesty. Only two former NP cabinet officials
applied for amnesty; P.W. Botha and F.W. de Klerk conspicuously refrained. This
flouting has left the TRC with significant gaps in its truth recovery effort and left South
Africa with a large pool of unrepentant perpetrators facing possible prosecution, a
political hot potato if ever there was one.
PAGE 9
Are Truth Commissions Jusl a Fad? Indicators and Implications from the South African TRC
Need for Contextualization
Zalaquett had also counseled that South Africa's truth commission would need to
"balance between case by case... and contextual references."42 The Act incorporated this
advice by mandating that the TRC make findings on "the nature, causes and extent of
gross violations of human rights, including the antecedents, circumstances, factors,
context, motives, and perspectives which led to such violation."43 The TRC's
interpretation of that part of the mandate led to another important innovation in the
continuum of truth commissions: the holding of thematic and institutional hearings. Van
Zyl discussed the logic in this: "We felt that it was impossible to paint as complete a
picture as possible unless we looked at the institutional and systemic dimensions," and in
order to be responsive to the Act's requirement to recommend administrative,
institutional, and legislative measures designed to prevent future human rights abuses,
"we felt that we would not be able to make sufficiently nuanced recommendations unless
we understood the institutional causes of them."44
In addition to human rights violations hearings, at which victims of gross human rights
violations were invited to testify in public, the TRC held event hearings or "window
cases," at which both victims, alleged perpetrators, and experts participated, so as to
thoroughly explore the context of a specific event, deliberately selected because it was
considered representative of broader patterns of abuse. Special Hearings on children and
youth and on women complemented this effort by looking at patterns of abuse
experienced by those specific groups. Finally, the TRC also held institutional hearings,
"exploring how various social institutions contributed to the conflicts of the past."45
These hearings played a positive role in shedding light on and provoking public debate
about the role the health sector, the judiciary, the media, the business sector, faith
communities and the prison system had had in apartheid South Africa.
Some of the institutional hearings were more successful than others, however.
Circumstances permitting, these hearings offered the added potential benefit of serving as
catalysts to trigger institutional change from within. Van Zyl points out, for example,
that the TRC's hearings on the health sector prompted an internal process within the
organized medical profession to review its code of ethics.46 But circumstances were not
always permitting. Participation in some of the institutional hearings, for example, left
something to be desired. Most judges and magistrates, citing concerns that participation
would somehow compromise their independence, declined to attend the institutional
hearing on the judiciary; only a few sent in written responses. The Final Report
addresses their non-participation with disdain:
"The failure of the judiciary to appear is all the more to be lamented when
the historic significance of the Commission is considered, as well as its
envisaged role in the transformation of South African society into a caring,
humane and just one. The Commission was thus denied the opportunity to
engage in debate with judges as to how the administration of justice could
adapt to fulfil the tasks demanded of it in the new legal system; not so as
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to dictate or bind them in the future, but so as to underline the need
urgently to re-evaluate the nature of the judiciary... The Commission
deplores and regrets the almost complete failure of the magistracy to
respond to the commission's invitation, the more so considering the
previous lack of formal independence of magistrates and their dismal
record as servants of the apartheid state in the past. They and the country
lost an opportunity to examine their role in the transition from oppression
to democracy." "
Beyond the obvious missed opportunities referred to above, the judges' and magistrates'
non-participation suggests that follow-through in taking concrete steps to transform the
judiciary will be grudging, at best. The same holds for those business representatives
who half-heartedly participated in the institutional hearing on business and labor, taking
the position that, because they did not actively or deliberately plan or participate in
human rights violations, they were effectively exempt from making submissions. Their
stated purpose in participating in the Commission was, rather, "to promote understanding
of the role of business under apartheid and to explore areas where business failed to press
for change..."48 This is a far cry from the ANC's position that, "historically privileged
business as a whole must... accept a degree of co-responsibility for its role in sustaining
the apartheid system of discrimination and oppression over many years."49 The passive-
voice recommendations that came out of this hearing (e.g., "that consideration be given to
the most appropriate ways in which to provide restitution for those who have suffered
from the effects of apartheid discrimination..." or that, "the feasibility of the following as
means of empowering the poor should be considered: a wealth tax; a once-off levy on
corporate and private income; each company listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange
to make a once-off donation of one percent of its market capitalization...") reflect the
difficulty the TRC encountered in reconciling these contrasting perspectives on
institutional responsibility, as well as the difficult road that lies ahead."
Nonetheless, these thematic and institutional hearings collectively helped the TRC avoid
the possible pitfall of looking at specific cases of human rights abuse in isolation. They
also allowed the TRC to highlight the institutional and societal legacies of apartheid, such
as the vast and egregious disparity that still exists between rich and poor. Finally, the
thematic approach permitted the TRC to get away from a strictly victim/perpetrator
approach to address the role of beneficiaries of apartheid, as well." That there was some
degree of reluctance on the part of both individuals and institutions who benefited from
apartheid to acknowledge as much, let alone "take the rap" for doing so, comes as no
surprise, and can be ascribed, in part, to the common mentality among whites that, "I
won't pay because I'm not guilty, I was not one of the perpetrators."" The prevalence of
this mentality, which is reflected in a March 1996 public opinion poll of white South
Africans, does not bode well for voluntary compliance with suggested reparative
measures like a wealth tax." Again, political leadership will be key to achieving greater
"buy-in," on the part of apartheid's beneficiaries to the notion that they have some degree
of responsibility in this regard.
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The Selection of Commissioners
The selection of commissioners proved to be a highly visible political exercise, the effects
of which would influence virtually every aspect of the TRC's work. Aside from serving
the largely symbolic function of leading the Commission and setting the tone for the
overall process, those who would be selected as commissioners would be tasked with
directing the more nuts and bolts work of TRC's three committees (on Human Rights
Violations, Reparations and Rehabilitation, and Amnesty) as well as the Investigation
Unit. Furthermore, though much of the drafting of the Final Report - most notably, the
Findings, and Recommendations - would be left to TRC staff, the Commissioners would
have the final say over the report's substance. The stakes were thus quite high.
The Act stipulates that "the Commission shall consist of not fewer than 11 and not more
than 17 commissioners," and that "The President shall appoint the commissioners in
consultation with the Cabinet."35 The Act also specifies, somewhat preposterously in
retrospect, that the commissioners must "not have a high political profile."56 It is
interesting to note that the Act left open the possibility of the appointment of up to two
non-South African commissioners, though it is not surprising that this route was not
taken, as it would have played to political sensitivities about outside influence.
Mandela chose to open up the selection process for even wider public participation than
was called for in the Act by inviting nominations from the public. A selection panel
comprised of members of civil society and government considered these nominations and
narrowed down a list of some 300 to a short list of 25, from which Mandela, in
consultation with his Cabinet and, significantly, the heads of the political parties, selected
15. Two additional appointments not from the short list - Rev. Khoza Mgojo and Adv.
Denzil Potgieter - were added to make a total of 17 commissioners, apparently to render
the commission more representative.57 Mandela later revealed that he had not personally
approved of all of his appointees, but that he had appointed them, in spite of his
reservations, in the interest of national unity.58
Though the commissioners' makeup was not strictly proportional to census figures, the
selection process clearly reflected a deliberate political attempt to achieve a high degree
of represent! vity. The result was a commission composed of seven women and ten men;
the racial breakdown was seven blacks, six whites, and two each of "coloured" and
Indian extraction. The Commissioners also spanned the political spectrum in their
political affiliations. Despite the good intentions which brought it about, this very
representivity, which yielded starkly contradictory views about human rights violations in
South Africa's past, let alone the political and moral accountability for such, was a recipe
for inertia when it came to interpreting the mandate and making tough political decisions.
To be fair, though, part of the problem can probably also be attributed to the large number
of Commissioners at the helm. Van Zyl has commented that the diverse composition of
the TRC's policy-making organ left Tutu and Boraine with the never-ending task of
trying to minimize the contradictions; eliminating them was out of the question.59
Boraine noted the practical effect: "Commissioners had a great deal of difficulty finding
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I I I . The Politics of the TRC
Many of us would have liked the TRC to be above politics. But it would be foolhardy to
expect an institution that was born of political compromise, that has operated in a
politically-charged environment, and whose mandate includes such politically-loaded
concepts as truth, reconciliation, and amnesty, to be anything but political. Michael Sharf
has observed that truth commissions are:
"inherently vulnerable to politically-imposed limitations and manipulation;
their structure, mandate, resources, access to information, willingness or
ability to take on sensitive cases - even the wording of the final report - are
all largely determined by political forces at play when they are created.""
Though Sharf may overstate the argument, one can certainly make this case with respect
lo the TRC, and it provides a useful point of departure for this discussion about the
politics of the TRC. In fact, it may also be useful to take Sharf s analysis a step further:
One can also anticipate that the political forces to which he referred will evolve over
time, that they will continue to influence public debate about the commission, if not the
commission itself, and that the proceedings of the commission, depending on its scope
and visibility, may also play a role in altering the political landscape. This is not to
suggest that the integrity of the TRC was compromised, that it did the political bidding of
any party or leader, or that it will single-handedly be responsible for making or breaking
any political careers. But there should be no illusion: the TRC process was a profoundly
political undertaking.
Much about the TRC process is unique to South Africa, because of the particularities
entailed in addressing its uniquely apartheid past. But all truth commissions take place in
a political context. It is therefore worthwhile to consider a number of illustrative
examples of how politics influenced the TRC process - and vice versa. This brief
examination of the politics of the TRC is not confined to the question of who applied
political pressure and why - although that is certainly important; it looks as well at
questions of appearances, "spin," and political consequences. For example, TRC
commissioners and staff were well aware of the political ramifications of their actions
and decisions, and they contemplated and debated such matters. In fact, they were often
on guard against political pressure with respect to such matters and indeed went out of
their way to avoid even the perception that the TRC was subject to outside influence.
Such evasive actions do not make it any less a political body; rather, they are evidence of
the kinds of political forces at play. The point is not to criticize the TRC, or for that
matter, those parties who may have attempted to influence it or use it as a political tool,
but rather to better understand the dynamics of such politicization. From a prescriptive
point of view, one might turn the logic of Sharf s observation around to consider how the
political reality that provides the backdrop to a truth commission can be a strength, rather
than a weakness in the pursuit of truth and reconciliation.
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each other and working with each other, which meant we spent a lot of energy on
maintenance, rather than on getting the job done."60 Racial undertones - and outright
racism - further complicated the dynamics. As Boraine said, "there was a great deal of
racism within the Commission itself. People were very quick to judge and to
undermine."61 The Final Report refers to these challenges only elliptically, but clearly
they were at the core of many of the Commission's problems.62
The Politics of the Amnesty Process
The issue of how the amnesty process would be administered was contested from the start
and the Amnesty Committee's decisions have frequently been second-guessed. Part of
the controversy stemmed from one of the compromises the NP had successfully lobbied
for in Cabinet: that amnesty hearings would be held behind closed doors. The provision
did not sit well either with human rights groups, especially coming on the heels of the
revelations that, on the eve of 1994 elections, then-President de Klerk had allowed some
3,000 people, including high-ranking police, military officers, and cabinet officials to be
secretly indemnified, without consulting the ANC.63 Human rights NGOs and media
organizations mounted a successful campaign to amend the legislation, with the result
that amnesty hearings involving gross violations of human rights would take place in
public, except where doing so would defeat the ends of justice.64
In addition, the original draft of the legislation put forward by Justice in Transition would
have had one of the Commissioners serve as Secretary of the Amnesty Committee. The
Amnesty Committee would have made recommendations on granting or denying
amnesty; the Commissioners would have taken final decisions. Another option
contemplated would have had recommendations on amnesty vetted by the President. The
NP objected to these proposals, arguing instead that the Amnesty Committee, comprised
of judges, should be independent from the Commission itself. Their aim was to insulate
the quasi-judicial decisionmaking on amnesty from political influence and potential bias.
Ultimately the NP was successful in its bid to have an Amnesty Committee as part of the
Commission itself, but with independent decision-making authority. Indeed, there are
sound reasons for an independent Amnesty Committee - any suggestion of bias could
sully the whole process - but provision also had unforeseen consequences. As Boraine
lamented in retrospect, "something of the spirit of the Commission was not transferred to
the Amnesty Committee.""
An anecdote about the Committee's early amnesty decisions illustrates the practical
impact of Boraine's observation. In the early batches of decisions handed down by the
Amnesty Committee, a pattern was seeming to establish itself, whereby white applicants
were refused amnesty, while black applicants were successful. To put the potential impact
of this trend in context, one need only consider the wariness with which perpetrators were
approaching the amnesty process. Of this, Lyn Graybill wrote that, "initially,
perpetrators were slow to come forward as many were waiting to see how judges
interpreted such ambiguous clauses of the amnesty legislation as 'politically-motivated
acts' and 'proportionality to objectives.'"6' When a Commissioner learned that the
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Amnesty Committee was on the verge of publicly releasing another batch of amnesty
decisions that would have fit this troubling pattern, the Commissioner intervened. An
exchange between Commissioner and Amnesty Committee representative was said to
have gone something like this: "Are there not any successful white applicants?" "Oh
yes, but they're not quite finalized." "Well finalize them now] Don't you realize that
these decisions have consequences!"67 That the Amnesty Committee was apparently
oblivious to the political signals it was sending when it announced those early decisions -
whether or not as a result of its strictly quasi-judicial function - points to one of the
possible downsides of its complete independence.
And then there is the Amnesty Committee's decision to grant amnesty to the 37 ANC
members who had applied collectively for amnesty, not for any specific act, but based on
the notion of their collective responsibility for any human rights violations perpetrated by
their members in the course of the struggle against apartheid. Misunderstandings abound
with respect to these applications, the Amnesty Committee's initial decision to grant
amnesty, the subsequent court challenges, and later reversal. Political parties (and their
leaders) seized on those misunderstandings to further their respective political objectives.
That there were no specific details about actual violations of human rights in the amnesty
applications of the ANC leaders is not as inauspicious as some of the opposition parties
have suggested. Those ANC leaders who applied for amnesty had not personally been
involved in executing or ordering any actions that would constitute gross human rights
violations; the applications were a symbolic gesture. The ANC's intentions in putting
forward this group of amnesty applications were two-fold. First, the ANC was sending a
political signal to its rank and file to the effect that: we leaders accept ultimate
responsibility for the excesses committed by comrades in furtherance of what was a just
cause - the struggle against apartheid; you too should cooperate with and participate in
the TRC process. In addition, the ANC was trying to set an example for the other
political parties' leaders, primarily those in the NP. The intended message to them was
more of a challenge: We accept political responsibility for excesses committed by our
comrades, will you do the same on behalf of your security forces? Amnesty Committee
Chairperson Justice Mall presided over the panel which initially granted amnesty to the
group. Van Zyl downplayed the role political pressure played in this case but suggested
that the fact that the ANC was the ruling party may have "subliminally influenced their
decision."68
However commendable the ANC's gesture was, the Amnesty Committee's decision to
grant amnesty was not in keeping with the Act's requirement of full disclosure.
Furthermore, the fact that the decision came without any public hearings stoked public
perceptions that the ANC had cut itself a deal with the TRC. The Commissioners,
meanwhile, were baffled by the Amnesty Committee's lack of political - let alone
judicial - judgment. The atmosphere within the TRC in the aftermath of the
announcement was one of panic; the Commission's credibility was on the line. Boraine
was said to be furious; Tutu appalled.6' The TRC barely beat the NP to the punch in
taking its own Amnesty Committee to court, but the decision to do so was not
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uncpntested. Ntsebeza, for example, has maintained that those ANC leaders who applied
for amnesty did so only because of their "association with the liberation movement under
whose name human rights violations occurred... It was a legitimate application."10
By taking its own Amnesty Committee to Court, the TRC was indirectly taking on the
ANC. Van Zyl opined that, "if an illustration were needed of impartiality, this would be
it."71 Unfortunately, however, the damage had already been done to the Amnesty
Committee's credibility, and it is not clear that the public understood the distinction
between the TRC's Amnesty Committee and the TRC proper. And so the positive
aspects of both the symbolic gesture on the part of the ANC and the resoluteness on the
part of the TRC were overtaken by the high-decibel partisan reactions and accompanying
media frenzy that greeted the Amnesty Committee's initial decision.
The NP brought its own court application to have the amnesties declared illegal, which
served the purpose of discrediting both the ANC and the TRC. Meanwhile, the ANC was
left in the unenviable situation of trying to defend the bona fides of its gesture when the
terms and the tone of debate had already been set - much to their disadvantage.72 The
media was complicit in focusing its attention more on the hyperbole of the debate than on
the complexities of the case.
In March 1999, the Amnesty Committee handed down a decision reversing itself and
rejecting amnesty: "In so far as the applicants seek to apply for amnesty for acts
committed by their members on the basis of collective political and moral responsibility,
their applications fall outside the ambit of the ... Act and accordingly they do not require
to apply for amnesty."73 Predictably, opposition parties took the opportunity to score
political points. The New National Party (NNP), for example, suggested that the ANC
leaders would now be liable to criminal and civil prosecution, and that "all this is of their
own doing because the ANC leaders were less than truthful... and played games with the
TRC when they lodged their amnesty applications."74 For its part, the IFP directed its
criticism at the TRC itself: "The legal challenge to the TRC concerning 'the ANC 37'
has revealed a staggering example of confusion, incompetence or something even more
sinister."75 Sinister forces, it seem make good political fodder. On a campaign swing
through Gugulethu, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela suggested that sinister forces were
responsible for the timing of the TRC's refusal to grant amnesty to the ANC leaders so
soon before the election.76
To put this in context, it is worth noting that this is not the only amnesty decision
subjected to close scrutiny or used for political gain. Take the recent decision to refuse
amnesty for Janus Walusz and Clive Derby-Lewis, who were convicted of the April 1993
murder of South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani. When the Amnesty
Committee denied amnesty on grounds that the applicants failed to make full disclosure
of their acts and that they lacked political motivation as required in the Act, several
predominantly white Afrikaner opposition parties promptly denounced the decision and
accused the Amnesty Committee of giving in to political pressure.77
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Those who served on the Amnesty Committee did encounter some pressure from political
parties, but in the words of one, it was "an indirect pressure," and its aim was not to
influence individual amnesty decisions but to prompt the Committee to finish its work as
quickly as possible.78 To this end, party leaders conveyed the message by letting the
Committee know that "funds will not be available forever," and through public
statements to the effect that, "We would not want to let the work of the Amnesty
Committee interfere with the election.""
One final aspect of the amnesty process that deserves attention is the decision to extend
the amnesty cut-off date from December 6, 1993 (the date the negotiations for an Interim
Constitution and multiparty democracy concluded) to May 10, 1994 (when President
Mandela was inaugurated). The Final Report explains the decision, which required an
amendment to the Interim Constitution, thus:
"The extension of the cut-off date for amnesty applications... was a
reminder of the transitional context in which this unique, accountable
amnesty process needed to be understood. The extension of the date was
due largely to pressure by, on the one hand, the white right-wing (the
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and Afrikaner Volksfront) which
opposed the elections by violent means and, on the other, black groups
such as the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and Azanian Peoples
Liberation Army (APLA), which had continued the 'armed struggle' during
the negotiation process. It became clear to the Commission in the course
of its work that such an extension would enhance the prospects of national
unity and reconciliation, because it would allow these groupings to
participate in the amnesty process."80
That the TRC itself lobbied Parliament on behalf of extending the cut-off date marks a
significant shift in the politics of the TRC. Graeme Simpson has criticized the TRC's
decision to actively lobby as, "a most fundamental political compromise (that)
demonstrated a willingness to play politics on the part of the TRC. Prior to that, the TRC
could claim that, whatever they were doing, they were doing no more than administering
in some senses a compromising political agreement reached by the ANC and the National
Party in the negotiation process."81 Others have defended the lobbying, pointing out that
TRC did so in the face of ANC's opposition to the idea of an extension. The rationale,
according to Van Zyl, was that the election was a more natural cut-off date; groups like
the PAC and AWB, who had at best a marginal influence in the multi-party talks - the
conclusion of which marked the Act's original cut-off date - had stopped engaging in
violence after the election; to insist on the original, more arbitrary date, he said, "smacked
of selective justice."82 Both arguments have merit, but on balance, it seems that the TRC
should have erred on the side of caution and refrained from active lobbying and let others
make the sound argument in favor of the later cut-off date. Furthermore, if, as many have
conjectured, the TRC lobbied for extending the cut-off date in order to achieve a greater
degree of "buy-in" on the part of the right-wing Afrikaners, one should also note that that
effort was not particularly successful.
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The Politics of Reparations (or Not)
The Act charges the TRC with making recommendations with respect to granting
reparations to victims, including urgent interim measures, but reserves the power to
implement those recommendations for the President in consultation with Parliament.
Only when the President's proposals are approved by Parliament is the government
empowered to make the necessary regulations.83 This requirement marks a departure
from the Act as originally drafted, which would have allowed the TRC to determine
compensation on its own. That the politicians would so insert themselves in the process
is understandable, given the fact that large sums of money would be involved. But the
fact that the legislation left the Commission without the ability to implement its own
recommended reparations policy has had profound consequences. In the words of the
Final Report, "reparation is essential to counterbalance amnesty," but the Commission's
mandate left it with a "glaring" contradiction between its ability to deliver amnesty, on
the one hand, and its inability to deliver reparations, on the other.84 This lack of
synchronicity has been exacerbated by delays. With regard to the urgent interim
measures, the Amnesty Committee's formulation of a recommended policy took longer
than expected, and there were further delays in the government's promulgation of
regulations to deliver them. That the first such payments (starting at a baseline of R2000)
were not made until July 1998 speaks volumes to these problems. Similarly, the
government's seeming reluctance to move forward on the individual reparations grants as
recommended in the Final Report has contributed to the perception on the part of many
victims that they have been shortchanged.85
The Final Report explains the rationale for its recommended individual reparations
grants:
The individual reparation grant is an acknowledgement of a person's
suffering due to his/her experience of a gross human rights violation. It is
based on the fact that survivors of human rights violations have a right to
reparation and rehabilitation. The individual reparation grant provides
resources to victims in an effort to restore their dignity. It will be
accompanied by information and advice in order to allow the recipient to
make the best possible use of these resources."86
The maximum individual reparation grant would total R23.023 per annum for a six year
period and would be administered by the President's Fund. The exact amounts would
vary, according to a formula that would differentiate between rural and urban-dwelling
victims (based on the assumption that accessing health services is 30 percent more
expensive in rural areas); and the number of dependants and/or relatives (up to maximum
of nine). The projected budget is R477,400,000 per annum, adding up to a six year total
of R2,864,400,000.87 With stakes this high, it is not surprising that the country's political
leaders would want to scrutinize the policy and subject it to a thorough costs/benefits
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analysis. What is of concern, however, are the increasing signals that the ANC is leaning
toward not granting individual reparations at all.
In part, the ANC is reacting to what, in the words of one interlocutor, it considers to be
"an absolutely disastrous proposal," in which the TRC "went way outside what is a fairly
clear conception of the law, that financial reparations would be a fairly token thing."88
The gist of the ANC's concern is that the generous grant recommended by the TRC risks
creating two classes of victims, those who were victims of gross human rights violations
and those who were merely victims of the everyday indignities and hardships under
apartheid. As a matter of policy, the ANC does not want to compensate one class of
victims at the expense of the other, especially when those other victims are also still
facing hardships associated with the legacy of apartheid.
It is conceivable that the ANC's sensitivity on this issue stems from memories of the
provision of financial assistance to returning exiles in the early 1990's, which led to
division between the ANC members who had been in exile, who stood to benefit, and
those who had stayed in the country, who did not. It would follow that the ANC would
not want to reawaken or exacerbate those tensions by providing generous reparations
grants to victims of gross human rights violations at the expense of the other victims of
apartheid, who may have suffered just as much, if not more.
In light of these concerns, it is useful to consider some recent public statements regarding
reparations: In February 1999, the ANC's Secretary-General Kgalema Motlanthe
suggested that the government was more inclined to make reparations to communities
rather than to individuals.89 Soon thereafter, Presidential Spokesman Parks Mankahlana
confirmed that this was the substance of the government's recommendation, but that the
Cabinet had yet to take a decision. Mankahlana justified the government's position thus:
"How do you compensate a person who left school because of police harassment... When
we reduce this into rands and cents then we are not addressing the whole notion of
reconciliation."90 Mbeki's Parliamentary statement on the TRC's Final Report sent
mixed signals on this question: He indicated that "we must also attend to the matter of
individual reparations, both in the form of cash and the provision of services," but he
also said that government should not insult the dignity of victims by trying to compensate
them with money. He hinted that the ANC's preference was for community-based
reparations that would benefit all victims of apartheid, saying that all South Africans
must be "ready and willing to provide reparations to entire communities, by helping to
pull them out of the wretched conditions which are the product of a gross and sustained
violation of their rights as human beings."
Simpson has criticized this position: "I sympathize with the dilemma, but it's a
marvelous excuse for doing nothing."91 The TRC cannot be too pleased, either. As early
as April 1998, Hlengiwe Mkhize, the chairperson of the Reparation and Rehabilitation
Committee, was cautioning about the need for a clear signal from the government about
its commitment to individual reparations grants.92 Naturally, the ANC's approach does
not sit well with the victim community, many of whom have come to expect individual
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compensation, in spite of bold-faced disclaimers like those that appear in the TRC's
pamphlet on reparations: "Please remember that these are proposals to the President.
The President and Parliament will make a final decision on them."93 What is not yet clear
is whether that perception will develop into a more serious political liability for the ANC.
The Politics of the End Game
Nobody anticipated the whirlwind of legal challenges and political maneuvering that
would usher in the release of the Final Report. The high drama that accompanied the
endgame soured the overall atmosphere and provoked bitter reactions. Lines were drawn,
and prospects for reconciliation looked dim as political parties, commissioners, and
commentators traded scathing sound bites. That the truth and reconciliation process
would be reduced to such spectacle is unfortunate. In retrospect, however, it is useful to
consider the politics that were at play, because they spotlight the high stakes of the TRC
process as a whole.
What started the ball rolling were the Section 30 notifications sent out by the TRC to
those against whom it intended to make derogatory "findings." The TRC so notified
former President F.W. de Klerk, whom it was to declare "an accessory to gross human
rights violations," because, among other things, in failing to report that he had known
about unlawful acts committed by the state's security forces (e.g., the 1988 bombing of
the headquarters of the South African Council of Churches), he had "contributed to
creating a culture of impunity within which gross human rights violations were
committed."94 Contesting the legitimacy of the findings, de Klerk launched an urgent
court interdict to prohibit the TRC from publishing them. He and the TRC reached a
settlement in which the TRC agreed temporarily to expunge from the Final Report
derogatory findings about him.93 De Klerk's last-minute settlement was conspicuously
evidenced in a page-worth text that was dramatically blacked-out in the Final Report. In
an ironic twist, in light of the ANC's own legal challenge that would soon follow, Justice
Minister Omar challenged the logic behind de Klerk's interdict and defended the TRC's
prerogatives: "The Commission must be allowed to boldly, courageously and without
interference speak its mind in the report..."96
In the Section 30 notification it sent out to the ANC, the TRC indicated that it planned to
find the ANC morally and politically responsible for gross human rights violations,
including the indiscriminate killing of civilians by planting landmines and during bomb
attacks, in addition to torture, severe ill-treatment, and execution of alleged spies. The
ANC was incensed by the perceived "criminalization" of the liberation struggle by the
TRC and the "moral equivalence" and "artificial even-handedness" with which the TRC
treated the abuses by the liberation movements and those of the former government and
security forces. An indignant ANC leaked the offending findings and demanded a
meeting with TRC commissioners. The ANC wanted to make the case that it had waged
a "just war" against apartheid, which was recognized as a crime against humanity.
Therefore, it would argue, abuses committed by those in the ANC should be seen as
"inseparable from the consequences of legitimate struggle."97 Critically, however, in
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focusing its energies on a face-to-face meeting, the ANC failed to respond in writing to
the TRC within the designated 15-day deadline.
The commissioners were deadlocked over how to respond to the ANC's request for a
meeting. Tutu, who was in the United States at the time, was called on to cast the
deciding vote. He voted against meeting with the ANC leadership on the grounds that
such a meeting would entail bending the regulations for the ruling party, which would be
both inappropriate and unfair.98 Those who voted with him were also troubled that such a
meeting would create the appearance of the TRC succumbing to political pressure from
the ANC, a concern the ANC described as "utter rubbish."99 Press leaks on both sides
fueled the explosive political climate that was developing.
With the face-to-face meeting route effectively closed, the ANC turned to a different
tactic. Apparently taking its cue from de Klerk, the ruling party launched a late-night
court interdict the night before the handover ceremony was scheduled to take place. It
aimed to prevent the TRC from publishing its Final Report unless and until it had taken
into consideration the ANC's response to the derogatory findings against it. On the
morning of October 29, 1998 the case was dismissed with costs, allowing the handover
ceremony to go forward.
Suggesting that the ANC action smacked of abuse of power, Tutu had vowed to fight the
ANC's interdict "with every fibre in my being," adding, "I have struggled against
tyranny. I did not do that in order to substitute another tyranny."100 Tutu's
characterization of the ANC as a new 'tyranny' reportedly angered some of his fellow
commissioners, and the following day, Tutu publicly apologized for "my self-
righteousness, my arrogance."10' If these developments stirred division within the TRC,
the effect was equally inflammatory within the ranks of the ANC. In the aftermath of the
failed attempt, several ANC politicians voiced their embarrassment and displeasure,
though most did so anonymously, saying, for example, that the court application was
"absolute nonsense... God only knows where that decision was taken and how it was
taken;" and that the move was "unbelievably stupid."102 Several ANC cabinet ministers,
members of the National Executive Committee and premiers also reportedly expressed
their personal regrets to Tutu and other commissioners.103
It became clear in the subsequent days and weeks that Mbeki, as ANC President, was
behind the decision to launch the court interdict; Mandela, it was said, had been
consulted, but he did not have a say in the decision. The strong insinuation was that,
although he objected to the offending findings, Mandela disagreed with the strategy of
pursuing a legal challenge, and his posture at the handover ceremony would seem to
confirm that. To the extent that there was a split within the ANC on the question, it
seemed to have been along the following fault-line: those who had fought so hard to keep
the armed struggle within the parameters of international norms and standards - and this
was primarily the ANC leadership in exile - were said to be the ones who were most
bitter about the findings, which offered little in the way of acknowledgement of their
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efforts.104 The media played up the significance of this apparent split in the ANC,
inferring troubling indicators about Mbeki's leadership style.105
In light of the ensuing political fall-out, it is worth revisiting the ANC's (over-) reaction
to the substance of the Final Report. First, that its leadership was so caught off guard
would seem to indicate that those who were responsible for TRC matters within the ANC
were asleep at the wheel, because, as many have pointed out, there were no surprises in
the Final Report. Its findings on the ANC, in fact, were based primarily on information
that the ANC had provided in its submissions to the TRC. As one ANC MP commented,
"There was nothing new in what the Commission found...it wasn't new until we made it
news."106 Beyond that, one should consider the troubling implications of the poisoned
atmosphere that characterized the endgame. The widespread disdain for the TRC within
the ruling party does not bode well for early or enthusiastic implementation of the TRC's
recommendations, particularly those that are politically sensitive or financially costly.
The Politics of Prosecutions (or Not)
The Final Report recommends that, "where amnesty has not been sought or has been
denied, prosecution should be considered where evidence exists that an individual has
committed a gross human rights violation..."107 In the aftermath of the release of the Final
Report, the recently-appointed NDPP was repeatedly asked whom among those
implicated in the TRC process he would prosecute, and there has seen been a great deal of
speculation in the South African media on the question. Ngcuka indicated obliquely that,
in the interest of national reconciliation, some cases should not be prosecuted.108 The
implicit logic is as follows: Certain prosecutions would provoke political violence,
which would be contrary to the goals of national reconciliation. In cases where
prosecutions would provoke violence and political instability, it follows, they should not
be pursued. Renascent violence in the tinderbox that is KwaZulu-Natal illustrates the
point; one need only imagine the widespread political violence that would ensue were the
NDPP to prosecute IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi or other prominent IFP leaders.
Both the underlying assumptions and the logic of this argument are certainly open to
challenge, however: CSVR Senior Researcher Hugo van der Merwe took them on in an
editorial in The Sunday Independent: "It would be a grave mistake to equate political
stability with genuine reconciliation. It may have been necessary to grant amnesty for the
sake of the transition to democracy, but we cannot justify the extension in response to
veiled threats of violence from implicated political leaders."109 Similarly, The Star
editorialized:
"If we are now going to accept the spurious argument that peace and
reconciliation depend on a blanket amnesty for the warmongers of
KwaZulu-Natal, and the torturers and murderers of the innocent, who had
an opportunity to come clean, that would be a kick in the teeth for those
who believed in the integrity of the process. And it would lend credence
to the suspicion that vote-catching next year is everything to the political
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parties leading the crusade for blanket amnesty, and the country be
damned."110
Many observers were surprised that talk of a general amnesty - in whatever guise - which
had been dismissed in the context of the multi-party talks leading to South Africa's
transition, resurfaced in late 1998. The scramble to come up with a politically-acceptable
post-TRC amnesty provision would seem to suggest that the ruling party failed to think
through what would happen to those high-profile alleged perpetrators against which the
TRC would make derogatory findings. Perhaps the ANC leadership and other architects
of the TRC just wrongly assumed that those very perpetrators would have applied for and
received amnesty. At any rate, the ANC is not united on the question of general amnesty;
those who lost loved ones - particularly to the orchestrated political violence between the
ANC and IFP that swept KwaZulu-Natai and the East Rand in the early 1990s - may not
be so quick to forgive their former adversaries, particularly if they shunned the amnesty
process. Some commentators have even suggested that such a move could provoke a
split within the ranks of the ANC.'"
Although Mandela spoke out strongly against the idea, pledging to "resist a general
amnesty with every power I have," the ANC has continued to flirt with the idea."2
Whatever the mechanism, de facto or dejure, whether by extending amnesty deadlines,
creating a new amnesty regime exclusively available to those who were party to political
violence in KwaZulu-Natal, or by exercising political control over the NDPP, there are
clear indications that the ANC is actively considering the options. Indeed, as recently as
May 1999, Mbeki suggested in an interview that a mechanism for collective amnesty
should be introduced to accommodate apartheid-era generals, among other groups; Omar
later confirmed that Mbeki had asked him "to draft legislation that would allow groups of
former soldiers and freedom fighters and members of political parties to apply for
amnesty without specifying individual acts of human rights violations.""3 A skeptical
Business Day editorial posed difficult questions about the proposed scheme: "What of the
thousands of individuals who approached the commission in the belief that if they failed
to get amnesty, they faced prosecution? And how does the idea of an indiscriminate
pardon square with the government's professed commitment to rebuilding the rule of law
and a human rights culture?""4
There have for some time been clear indications that the ANC leadership was leaning in
this direction: In the Parliamentary debate on the TRC Final Report, for example,
although both Mandela and Mbeki stated that a general amnesty should not be
entertained, Mbeki also indicated that, "we will have to discuss such proposals as have
been made on this matter with regard to KwaZulu-Natal and others put forward by the
former generals of the SADF who have themselves confirmed their loyalty to the country
and its Constitution..." In March 1999, Omar was reported to say that "the TRC process
had by-passed the province of KwaZulu-Natal for lack of support, and there needed to be
a response to the wounds caused by the human rights violations that took place
there...there should be some process to allow the warring parties to come to terms with
the past.""5
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As Business Day surmised, one can probably dismiss Mbeki's professed concern about
enticing apartheid generals to come forward this late in the game as something of a "a red
herring," as there is "no evidence that they continue to pose a threat to the state.""6
Rather, the ANC's motivations, appear to be two-fold: First, it wants to forestall the
sharp increase in political violence that many commentators have predicted would engulf
KwaZulu-Natal (and possibly other parts of the country as well) in the event of criminal
prosecution of the IFP leaders who were implicated in gross human rights violations but
who shunned the amnesty process. A second but related motivation is to facilitate the
rapprochement apparently under way between the ANC and the IFP. In the run-up to the
June 1999 elections, there has been widespread speculation that the ANC wishes to bring
IFP supporters into its fold so as to help it secure a two-third's majority in Parliament.
Presumably, aside from being offered the Deputy Presidency - something that has been
widely forecast in the South African media, the IFP would insist on the non-prosecution
of its leaders as one condition for any such arrangement. Many commentators have
speculated that the repeated floating of trial balloons on the question of amnesty is
evidence enough that a deal has already been cut between Mbeki and Buthelezi.
Providing for "Group" amnesties would seem to be just the creative mechanism the ANC
was looking for so as to avoid the political fallout associated with "blanket" amnesties,
while allowing it to effectively achieve the same political objective. However, it is not at
all clear that such a mechanism, which would evidently favor some groups over others,
could withstand a constitutional test. In the meantime, tough choices on whom to
prosecute await Bulelani Ngcuka. It is not yet clear how much political influence he will
be subject to. For its part, the TRC has submitted to the office of the NDDP a list of 100
alleged perpetrators for whom it recommends prosecution, and the Final Report indicated
that the TRC would make available to the appropriate authorities relevant information
(excluding privileged information from amnesty applications)."7
Aside from what is desirable from a moral and political perspective, one must also
consider the feasibility of bringing criminal prosecutions. The NDPP's choices on this
matter will be influenced by practical constraints associated with a limited budget and
opportunity costs. For every trial of an apartheid-era perpetrator, that many fewer
resources will be available to try ever-increasing present-day criminal caseloads.
Furthermore, having been stung by the failed prosecution of former Defense Minister
Malan and his co-accused, the state will likely establish a high evidentiary threshold. The
net result is that it is unlikely that more than a handful of prosecutions will proceed from
the TRC process.
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IV. Report Card
Noting the benefits and indeed appropriateness of the ad-hoc nature of truth commissions,
which are designed to suit country-specific conditions, Hayner has suggested that that
there is nonetheless a need for "minimal standards" that a truth commission should meet
if it is to be considered "a serious, good faith effort and respectful of those who will be
affected by its work."'" Such standards, she points out, could also "facilitate appropriate
international and national oversight." " ' Hayner built on the work of U.N. Sub-
Commission for Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Special
Rapporteur Louis Joinet, who first proposed such guidelines in a document entitled, "Set
of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to
Combat Impunity."120 The International Criminal Court (ICC), once it is operational, will
doubtless weigh in with its own criteria.121 In the meantime, thinking on these questions
will continue to evolve, and flinders will, based on their own assessments, vote with their
checkbooks. Those contemplating truth commissions in the future could also benefit
from prospective consideration of such guidelines, along with an understanding of the
potential pitfalls that necessitate them. Among other things, an honest exercise of this
nature could help establish whether a society is, to borrow a concept from the field of
conflict resolution, "ripe" for a truth commission, thereby forestalling a premature or
otherwise inappropriate commission.122 To the extent that other societies can learn from
the South African experience, it would be useful to consider not only how South Africa
measured up, but why. What circumstances in South Africa lent themselves to the
relative success or failure in each area?
The assessment of the TRC below draws liberally from the guidelines suggested by both
Hayner and Joinet to assign six benchmarks against which to "grade" the South African
TRC.123 A couple caveats are in order, though: First, it would be simplistic to confine
the assessment process to the TRC, per se, without distinguishing among the different
actors - the government, the TRC, political parties, NGOs, and others who have played a
role. Second, it would be a mistake to focus only on the end product; the TRC has been a
process, and that process is ongoing. The relevant actors have shouldered varying
degrees of responsibility at different phases of the commission's life. The benchmarks
below are grouped under philosophical/conceptual and practical/logistical categories, and
they apply, as appropriate, to those who were responsible for decisionmaking in the
formative stages, those who were responsible for carrying out its mandate, and those who
are responsible for implementing its recommendations. Some of the benchmarks are, by
definition, more subjective than others, and all of the grades, at this point, can only be
considered preliminary.124 It will take several generations before we can assess the long-
term impact of the TRC. Finally, the examples cited below are illustrative, and where
relevant, refer back to the preceding pages.
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Philosophical/Conceptual Benchmarks
I. Public Ownership of the TRC: B
Hayner placed the criterion, "public participation in crafting the commission" at the top
of her list, and she cites the South African model as the exception to the norm in its
"extensive public participation."1" Credit goes to a highly engaged, well-informed NGO
community, veterans of similar exercises who shared their expertise with South African
interlocutors, the flinders who had the foresight to channel funds to support such efforts,
and a responsive Ministry of Justice. Open hearings in Parliament also facilitated healthy
public debate and input, evidenced most dramatically by the successful lobbying
campaign to amend the legislation so that amnesty hearings would be held in public.
Extensive media coverage, although not without bias, was instrumental in keeping the
public informed throughout the process. In particular, daily South African Broadcasting
Corporation (SABC) radio coverage of the TRC hearings, broadcast in South Africa's
indigenous languages, made the TRC more accessible to South Africa's rural black
population. In addition, SABC television scored high viewership of its weekly "Special
Report," in which maverick journalist Max Du Preez highlighted important developments
relating to the TRC.
Cumulatively, these factors contributed to a sense of public ownership, at least in the
early stages. But Hayner's guidelines also explicitly provide that the lines of
communication should be kept open throughout the process, "to allow public feedback on
the methodology and impact of the commission's work."126 It is on this score that the
TRC seems to have faltered. Having played such an instrumental role in crafting the
TRC, it came as a shock to some NGOs when the TRC, once it became operational,
closed ranks. Although the TRC periodically called on NGOs to provide a variety of
advisory or consultative capacities, the NGO community did not enjoy the access to or
influence with the TRC that they had come to expect.127 "From the point at which the
Commission got up and running, it became a 'fairly exclusive club,'" according to
Simpson.128
This is not to suggest that there was not significant public feedback—there was, through
the media, through one-on-one representations by NGO representatives to individual
Commissioners or staff, even through public demonstrations by victims' groups. But
what seemed to be lacking was the requisite responsiveness on the part of the TRC. Van
der Merwe et al. attributed this difficulty of engaging effectively with the Commission to
a couple of different dynamics, including lack of capacity of many NGOs, particularly
victims' groups and peace NGOs, which have not traditionally performed lobbying
activities.129 Perhaps more importantly, the TRC's posture vis-a-vis NGOs resulted from
the internal politics of the deliberately representative Commission. Those commissioners
who came from a politically-conservative background opposed engaging with human-
rights oriented NGOs that were perceived as being too closely linked with the former
liberation movements.130 In addition, Van der Merwe et al. ascribed the relative success
of the NGO community in the lobbying phase, compared to its failure to engage in the
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operational phase as a function of political dynamics. When it was politically expedient,
the political parties co-opted the NGOs: "The overlaps between NGO and political
agendas were effectively exploited during the lobbying phase of the TRC. However, the
failure of NGOs to develop the anticipated close relationship between themselves and the
TRC possibly reflects a broader tension between the competing agendas of the state and
NGOs.""1
Borrowing now from Joinet, one should also consider under this rubric the publicity
given to the Commission's report. Mandela, speaking of the Report that "today becomes
the property of our nation," did the right thing in publicly releasing the report as soon as
it was turned over to him by the TRC, despite the fact that some members of his party
would have had him delay release for the two months that the Act would have allowed.1"
South Africa's Independent Newspapers group and the Institute for Democracy in South
Africa did their part by publishing and distributing key sections of the report as
newspaper supplements. The TRC also has maintained an outstanding web site
(www.truth.org.za), which has played an invaluable role in keeping those with access to
internet technology (granted a limited segment of the South African population) abreast
of the TRC's proceedings. Unfortunately, the former webmaster of the TRC's site, faced
with threatened legal action, removed the electronic version of the Final Report, which
was previously available to the public free of charge.133
It is perhaps in the aftermath of the release of the Final Report that the public's
involvement in the truth and reconciliation process is most critical. The hard part of the
TRC process involves making choices - on individual and societal levels - accepting
responsibility, and taking concrete steps to take on the legacy of apartheid to transform
society. Tutu and Boraine certainly tried to get this message across by emphasizing in
their public comments in the run-up to the hand over of the Final Report and at the
ceremony itself that this event marked the beginning, not an end to the process. The
Final Report, too, addresses this reality: "South Africans will need to continue to work
towards unity and reconciliation long after the closure of the Commission," which, in the
words of a participant in one of the TRC's public meetings, "could do no more than "kick
start" the process.'34 As Mandela said in the Parliamentary debate of the Final Report,
"Long after the Commission has folded and its offices closed, political
leaders and all of us in business, the trade union movement, religious
bodies, professionals and communities in general shall have to remain
seized with the matters that the TRC process brought to the fore. In as
much as reconciliation touches on every aspect of our lives it is our
nation's lifeline."
Faith communities and community-based organizations are uniquely placed to perform
outreach and organizing functions of this nature, but ultimately, it is on the individual
level that reconciliation takes place and the seeds for societal transformation are planted.
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The public's involvement in this phase obviously will be shaped by a variety of factors.
At this early stage, it will suffice to mention three initiatives that are developing in
response to the Final Report. First, aside from individual reparations grants, the TRC
recommended and politicians have thus far seemed responsive to the idea of symbolic,
community-based reparations, including monuments and memorials. To the extent that
the public can be involved in making decisions such as these, so much the better. In
addition, former TRC Director of Research Charles Villa-Vicencio is establishing an
NGO that will be concerned with the follow-up to the TRC. Many have argued
persuasively about the potential benefit of continuity that such an institute could provide
by preserving the body of skill and expertise internal to the Commission. To be effective,
this NGO will have to be more methodical than was the TRC in reaching out to and
taking advantage of existing networks of community-based organizations. There have
been some questions about the institute's credibility, however. To this end, the institute
should avoid potential conflicts of interest in evaluating the TRC. Finally, Members of
Parliament have stated their intention to have a national summit on reconciliation, as
recommended in the Final Report. Ideally, such an exercise should be fed from the
grassroots up in a transparent and inclusive process, and it should be focused on
translating the TRC's recommendations into concrete programs of action to make
tangible progress toward the long-term goals of reconciliation and transformation of
society.'"
2. The Mandate of the TRC: B+
Hayner rightly has called for a "flexible but strong" mandate, something for which, to the
credit of the extensive public consultations referred to above, the architects of the TRC
and those who provided input score high marks.136 Charged with the following tasks, the
TRC has, as many have pointed out, the most ambitious mandate of all truth commissions
to date:
• establishing, as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the
gross violations of human rights during a 34-year period;
• facilitating the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the
relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective;
• making known the fate and whereabouts of victims and restoring their dignity by
affording them the opportunity to relate their own accounts of violations which they
suffered; and
• producing a report, including recommendations for the prevention of future human
rights violations.137
The mandate also includes exemplary "principles to govern the Commission's dealings
with victims."138 In practice, the TRC recognized that it could not carry out all of the
components of its mandate simultaneously, so it endeavored to set the tone for the whole
process by holding victims' hearings first, along with relevant statement-taking and
investigations. If the restoration of victims' dignity was the TRC's top priority, this was
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not always apparent to victims, however.'" To be fair, the government and Parliament
are due some share of the blame on this count: delays in implementing the TRC's
recommended reparations program resulted in the first "urgent interim" reparations not
being delivered until July 1998, and the individual reparations grants still hang in the
balance.
The Act's definition of "'gross human rights violation" was limiting, in that it precluded
ex post facto criminalization of legally sanctioned apartheid activities, such as forced
removals, and thus is not in conformity with Joinet's principles, which favor terms of
reference that would give commissions the "jurisdiction to consider all forms of human
rights violations."140 Nonetheless, the Act did give the TRC significant leeway in tasking
it with painting a backdrop of the "antecedents, circumstances, factors and context of
such violations, as well as the perspectives of the victims and the motives and
perspectives of the persons responsible."141 The Final Report speaks with eloquence
about these "everyday" victimizations inherent in the apartheid system:
"Apartheid was a grim daily reality for every black South African.
For at least 3.5 million black South Africans it meant collective
expulsions, forced migration, bulldozing, gutting or seizure of
homes, the mandatory carrying of passes, forced removals into
rural ghettos and increased poverty and desperation... One did not
need to be a political activist to become a victim of apartheid; it
was sufficient to be black, alive and seeking the basic necessities of
life that whites took for granted and enjoyed by right."142
The arbitrariness of the mandate's cut-off dates for amnesty eligibility was highlighted by
Parliament's subsequent decision to extend the eligibility period from December 6, 1993
to May 10, 1994. A certain degree of arbitrariness was inevitable in the South African
context, because, as the Final Report notes, "racism came to South Africa in 1652."143
What is perhaps more troubling, as discussed above, is that the TRC itself lobbied
Parliament on behalf of extending its mandate period.
3. Impartiality and Independence of the TRC: B
Hayner's call for "political backing but operational independence" for truth commissions
complements the principle of "impartiality" Joinet specifies.'44 These elements are
combined under this benchmark, because they address the question of independence from
two different angles. Hayner pointed out that, to be effective, a truth commission must
have official backing; this political backing sets the tone for the country's interaction with
the truth commission. In addition, one can infer that it would translate, when appropriate,
to operational support for the commission on the part of the government, for example, in
facilitating access to government documents. But, if a truth commission is to be credible,
it must also have the freedom to exercise judgment, even on controversial political issues,
free from influence - direct or indirect - from the government and/or any other major
political players. But this logic presupposes impartiality - operational independence is
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rendered meaningless if the truth commission is not impartial to begin with and is not
perceived to stay that way throughout the process.145
The TRC struggled with politics from day one, and accusations of bias dogged it through
the end. A commendable vetting process for the commissioners, besides facilitating
public input, helped ensure that individual commissioners were reasonably impartial, but
the selection process entailed no small amount of political horse-trading. Whether or not
as a result of the Commission's deliberate diversity, when the commissioners were
around a table to make a decision, they often reverted lo their "representative'" roles,
which was a recipe for paralysis.'*6 Tutu and Boraine had the habit of saying that the
Commission was a microcosm of South African society at large, and thai anv internal
disputes were merely a reflection of that reality. But this excuse notwithstanding, the
fact that certain commissioners were perceived - rightly or wrengiy - as representing
political (or racial) constituencies, reinforced this problem, and it made individual
commissioners and the TRC as a whole easy targets for criticism of this nature.
An anecdote about a meeting between TRC Commissioners and President Mandela
illustrates the integrity that Mandela brought to this equation, however. Consider this
scenario: The top leadership of the TRC, including the 17 Commissioners, makes an
appointment to meet with President Mandela. When Mandela learns that de Klerk and
Buthelezi, whose parties were both then partners in the Government of National Unity
(GNU), had not been included in the meeting, he becomes quite upset. Mandela permits
the group to stay for a non-substantive courtesy call, but he lets the Commissioners know
that in the future, he would insist that the others be included in any meetings. "I want
you to be independent. I don't want you to be anything other than independent," he is
quoted as saying.1"
That said, political parties did, with increasing frequency over the lifespan of the
Commission, try to exert pressure on the TRC, although they were usually savvy enough
to do so indirectly.HB Opportunistic leaks were apparently the favored vehicle for
administering such pressure, and the media - some outlets more sensationally than others
- often overplayed the political drama or controversy. It was not unheard of, particularly
in the last act, for party representatives to pick up a telephone and call Commissioners
directly. But if Commissioners and staff were not immune to political pressure, neither
were they blameless. I know of at least one instance where Commission representatives
tried to exert political pressure on NGO representatives to call off a demonstration
organized by victims to protest the non-delivery of reparations.14'
For political parties, the TRC process represented an excuse for good old-fashioned
political hay-making. As such, their politicking was not so much directed at infringing
on the independence of the Commission, as it was at using the TRC to score political
points. At some point not long into the Commission's life, it became politically
expedient for political parties to play to (if not foment) popular discontent with the TRC.
This culminated in the unseemly politics of the endgame, which proved, if nothing else,
that TRC was nobody's lackey. But at what cost to the long-term goal of reconciliation?
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The partisan nature of much of the Parliamentary debate about the Final Report and the
campaign politics in the run-up to the June 1999 elections also revealed this inclination.
Ironically, the fact that the TRC was disparaged by all political parties served to
contribute to its credibility as a body that was not subject to political influence. Although
it cannot very well be addressed statutorily, future commissions may wish to consider
how to tie the interests of political parties - usually focussed on short term political gain
- to the long-term success of the TRC.
4. Legacy oflhe TRC: C-
Under this benchmark, one might consider the TRC's "deliverables" and the extent to
which they are likely to make a lasting, positive difference in the lives of individual
South Africans and society at large. The disappointing grade requires a couple of
caveats: First, the borderline unsatisfactory mark is not so much directed at the end
products that the TRC has delivered - these have been, by and large, well-conceived and
executed - rather, it is a reflection of the less than auspicious circumstances in which
those deliverables have been rendered. Second, the concept of "legacy" is laden with
moral and political value judgments, and attempts at prognostication on the question of
the TRC's legacy are premature, if not presumptuous; only with the passage of time can
one begin to tackle issues associated with the TRC's long-term impact. In the meantime,
however, one might consider the quality of the TRC's deliverables and their short- Jo
medium-term prospects. This paper will confine itself to looking at four end products
that have come out of the TRC process: the Final Report, amnesty, reparations, and
recommendations. Reconciliation has purposefully been excluded from this early
assessment of "deliverables." Despite its prominence in the TRC's title, it was never
anticipated that reconciliation would be an immediate outcome of the TRC.
• The Final Report. Mandated with compiling a "comprehensive report which sets out
its activities and findings," the TRC obliged with a 3,500-page, five-volume report..'50 As
Hayner has pointed out, the TRC's Final Report itself is probably less important in South
Africa, where the whole process has been characterized by "an amazing degree of
transparency," as were the final reports of truth commissions in most of the Latin
American cases, where truth commissions operated behind closed doors.l3' This
observation certainly holds true in the short term, when memories of the TRC's often
graphic hearings are still fresh. The Final Report and TRC archives will assume a. more
important role as these memories fade.
Has the Final Report established the Truth? It's mandate, wisely, was more nuanced: "to
establish as complete a picture as possible..." As Afrikaner poet, journalist and author
Antjie Krog pointed out, truth can have different meanings, and "each narrative carries
the imprint of its narrator.'"" The picture that emerges from the Final Report represents a
monumental achievement. It includes an historical backdrop to contextualize its
thorough documentation of apartheid-era atrocities, both within and outside South Africa.
Complementing its depiction of the broad outlines and patterns of abuses, the Final
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Report highlights illustrative cases, drawn largely from the TRC's human rights
violations hearings. Although it does not lend itself easily to quantitative analysis, one
should not underestimate the value of the process by which the TRC gave a voice to those
who were victims of atrocities. Finally, as many commentators have pointed out, as a
result of the TRC process and its documentation in the Final Report, it is no longer
possible to plausibly deny the nature or extent of atrocities that took place in apartheid
South Africa.
Among the Final Report's shortcomings are its often sketchy details about the
Commission's operations and decision-making process, especially on controversial
decisions, as well as the lack of significant detail on the pros and cons of such. And
while the TRC was justified in applying the same standards of human rights across the
board, in doing so, it occasionally lapsed into a language of moral absolutism that
bordered on condescension, and it was this, perhaps, more than the judgments
themselves, that so riled the ANC.'"
• Amnesty. With regard to amnesty, there were a number of challenges and few were
completely satisfied with the process. First, the TRC was confronted with a "barrage of
litigation" pertaining to the question of amnesty.'" The Azanian Peoples Organisation,
along with the Biko and Mxenge families challenged the constitutionality of the amnesty
provisions. As Sarkin noted, lack of clarity on the constitutionality of the Act "saw the
Amnesty Committee's work delayed pending resolution of the question."1" Second,
everyone, it seems, was surprised by the fact that some 7,200 individuals applied for
amnesty, and the Amnesty Committee was simply overwhelmed by the volume. Once
the Amnesty Committee had a full complement of staff and resources, it was better able
to deliver with timely investigations and hearings, but the pressure to work through the
backlog, according to Pigou, resulted in the fact that "the vast majority of amnesty
applications have not been subjected to an investigative process of any sort..."'56 Kader
Asmal, et al. Faulted the Commission for not interpreting its mandate in such a way that
perpetrators would have to apologize for their actions in order to receive amnesty."' On
the other hand, Marius Schoon, whose wife and daughter were blown up by a parcel
bomb sent by security force agents, objected strenuously to the "crocodile tears"
proffered by one of the perpetrators."8 Many victims also complained about the short
turnaround time faced by perpetrators who received amnesty, compared to their own
lengthy wait for reparations.
Objections to the very notion of amnesty have also persisted. Critics argue that, aside
from contributing to an atmosphere of impunity, amnesty lends an aura of legitimacy to
the heinous acts that were committed in the name of apartheid, revictimizes the survivors
of horrific acts, and risks debasing the whole society in the process. A growing sense of
repugnance on the part of South African people - particularly victims - toward the notion
of granting amnesty to perpetrators, left Tutu on the defensive: "We did not decide on
amnesty. The political parties decided on amnesty...""' His comments reflect an
interesting dynamic that developed in this context: for the most part, political parties
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escaped criticism for the amnesty provision to which they agreed. Instead, such criticism
was directed primarily at the TRC
• Recommendations/Reparations. The TRC was specifically tasked with making
recommendations regarding "the creation of institutions conducive to a stable and fair
society and the institutional administrative and legislative measures" required to prevent
human rights violations, as well as the "granting of reparation to victims or the taking of
other measures aimed at rehabilitating and restoring the human and civil dignity of
victims." '60 It is useful to consider both the appropriateness of the TRC's
recommendations and the extent to which one can have a reasonable expectation that they
will be implemented.
Turning first to those recommendations that concern reparations, one should
acknowledge that the TRC's recommended reparations regime is tempered by a greater
degree of realism vis-a-vis budgetary and political constraints than are the Joinet
principles.'" For example, Joinet asserts the victim's right to and the state's duty to make
reparations for "any human rights violation," compensation for which "must equal the
financially assessable value of all damage suffered."162 Among other things, the Joinet
principles include similarly worded provisions for rehabilitative measures, such as
medical or psychological care; and measures of collective reparation, such as
commemorative ceremonies and monuments. Joinet also refers to the right of victims to
"a readily available, prompt and effective remedy in the form of criminal, civil, and
administrative or disciplinary proceedings," which, given the TRC's amnesty provisions,
the Commission obviously cannot deliver.163 Aside from these gaps, which are all
attributable to political compromise or budgetary realism, one should recognize that the
government and Parliament share the blame for the considerable lag time that has
characterized the actual delivery of reparations. That the first payments of "urgent
interim reparations" were not made until July 1998, for example, is appalling. When
contrasted with the short turn-around that perpetrators faced in receiving amnesty, the
seemingly interminable wait for reparations not only skewed the balance upon which the
TRC was crafted, but also has created significant political problems for both the
government and the TRC. To its credit, the TRC was able to play a positive role in
exhuming bodies, identifying and turning over remains to victims' families for proper
burial.
Depending on how one counts them, there are about 250 separate recommendations in the
Final Report.1" Unfortunately, the quantity of the recommendations is not always
matched in their quality. Some, for example, are so vaguely worded, they risk trivializing
the exercise. What does the TRC really mean, for example, when it recommends that
"the Government must ensure that the rule of law, human rights practice, transparency,
accountability and the rooting out of corruption and other forms of criminality at all
levels of society are seriously addressed" (emphasis mine)?165 Neither is it always clear
to whom the recommendations are directed. While it may serve a useful purpose to use
the passive voice - and thus avoid finger-pointing - recommendations to the effect that
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"strategies be devised for reintegrating perpetrators into society" do not easily lend
themselves to implementation or accountability.166 Other recommendations reflect an
expansive interpretation of the mandate, seemingly overstepping the bounds of
preventing human rights violations. One might ask, for example, how the following
assertion falls within the TRC mandate: "If organised crime is to be combated, those
involved in crime syndicates will have to come forward. This is only likely if such
persons are assured of comprehensive witness protection." l6' Finally, those
recommendations that are accompanied by a brief explanation or rationale are
significantly more useful than those that are not.168
That said, one could argue that if a Commission is to err in making recommendations, it
is better to err on the side of too many over too few, and in an expansive raiher than
minimalist interpretation of the appropriate scope of the recommendations. In the South
African case, at least, the pervasive legacy of apartheid may justify such an approach.
The majority of the TRC's recommendations reflect a well thought-through response to
both the glaring needs for societal transformation and more practical needs - particularly
those of victims - that became apparent in the TRC process.
Whether these recommendations are implemented is, of course, another matter. The
degree to which implementation is carried out is not only a function of political will,
which would be hard to muster in any case, given that the recommendations are not
prioritized, and most carry a costly price tag. Even in the best of circumstances, there
would be fierce competition for South Africa's scarce resources, which are just as much
needed to redress basic human needs gaps for South Africa's black population, not all of
whom qualified for "victim" status under the Act. Sensitivity to this dilemma is at least
partly responsible for the reluctance on the part of some politicians to authorize the
individual reparations grants that the TRC recommended for victims of gross human
rights violations. But the dynamics of the hostile political climate that pervaded at the
endgame have exacerbated what would have already been bleak prospects for
implementation. We are already seeing signs of dismissiveness on the part of some
politicians towards some of the recommendations. As mentioned above, the ANC has
been entertaining the idea of symbolic reparations in lieu of the individual reparations
grants that the TRC recommended.
Similarly, despite Mandela's rejection of a blanket amnesty, the ANC's continued
flirtation with the notion {de facto, if not dejure; "group," if not "blanket") flies in the
face of the TRC's recommendation that, "in order to avoid a culture of impunity and to
entrench the rule of law, the granting of a general amnesty in whatever guise should be
resisted" (emphasis mine)."9 Indeed, a general amnesty would make a mockery of the
whole TRC process. On top of that, to the extent that the example of the TRC and the
lessons learned from it are studied by the architects of (and participants in) future
commissions — and as it has been argued above, there are a variety of reasons why this
might be anticipated, not as a blueprint, certainly, but as a model nonetheless — one
should consider the possible implications for those future truth commissions in the event
that South Africa fails to prosecute those who fall into this category.
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Neil Kritz has pointed out, for example, that the failure to prosecute such perpetrators in
South Africa would effectively emasculate future truth commissions of any credibility
should they wish to adopt the South African model of threatening prosecutions against
those who do not come forward."0 Absent the leverage offered by the credible threat of
prosecution, perpetrators would be emboldened to eschew the amnesty process, with
potentially disastrous consequences for future commissions that aim to establish the facts
about the past and to hold perpetrators accountable for their actions in at least some
nominal fashion. And if the threat of political instability (let alone political expediency)
can be wielded to effectively stymie prosecutions in a society that had all the benefits that
South Africa had, including a well-established rule of law and a functioning (if flawed)
judicial system, one need only imagine what the prospects of prosecution might be in
societies without them. Clearly, these potential ramifications are not foremost on the
minds of those responsible for making decisions on the question of whom (if anyone)
should be prosecuted in South Africa, but they should at least not be ignored.
Of course, some recommendations will carry less of a political cost than others, and these
may face better prospects. Many of the recommendations are directed at non-
governmental actors, such as faith communities and the business sector. And while the
TRC, or the government, for that matter, has little leverage with which to effect their
implementation, it does not necessarily hurt to make them. The NGO sector will play a
key role in the follow-up stage, particularly in performing advocacy and watch-dog
functions regarding the implementation of the recommendations. Here, South Africa is in
excellent hands.
Practical/Logistical Issues
5. Administration of the TRC: Cy-
linder this rubric, in addition to considering management issues, one might combine two
separate guidelines of Hayner: "time and resources for preparation and set up," and
"appropriate funding and staffing," as they are two sides of the same coin, at least in the
South African case."' The harsh grade is a reflection, perhaps, of the high expectations
that so many had for a truth commission that came into being with all the benefits this
one had: Interested South Africans had done their homework, which was reflected in a
well-crafted mandate. The TRC also had significant resources, in terms of both human
capital and funding. At its height, the TRC had approximately 400 staff members. This
compares with about El Salvador's 30-strong commission, Chile's staff of 60, and about
200 persons who staffed the Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission."2 In terms
of funding, the TRC's total operating budget was about R16S million (about $27.5
million, or about $9 million a year), according to the Final Report."3 Foreign funding
amounting to several million rand augmented this budget. Thus, the TRC's funding far
surpassed those of other truth commissions; for example, El Salvador's annual budget
was $2.5 million, and Chile's was closer to $1 million."4
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Why then, one might ask, were there chronic administrative problems? In its Final
Report, the TRC asserts that one of its greatest challenges was the absence of a provision
for a start up period, like that which Hayner recommends, during which "offices could be
located and established, staff sought and appointed, and a modus operandi carefully
developed. There was little time for reflection."'" This sentiment was echoed by the
Secretary of the Amnesty Committee, who, when asked what, if anything, he would
recommend be done differently, said, "there should be a considerable time period in
which to prepare for what will be forthcoming... if you had the full complement of 99
people in place two years ago, I think we would have been finished by now.""6 The TRC
can perhaps be forgiven, then, for the ad-hocism that characterized its day-to-day
operations in the early stages. As time went on, the TRC seemed to be plagued with one
crisis after another, including a steady stream of litigation. As a result, the TRC operated
in crisis mode much of the time, with predictable consequences for long-term
management.
Some have suggested that the TRC's seeming managerial deficit was largely a function of
having two ministers at the helm. In exploring this line of thinking, one should not
discount that both Tutu and Boraine had impeccable credentials in terms of moral
integrity. The TRC could well have faltered without such strong moral leadership. Krog
characterized Tutu as the compass of the Commission: "The process in unthinkable
without Tutu. Impossible.""7 Krog noted, however, that there was considerable baggage
associated with his ecclesiastical leadership style: "Tutu from the beginning
unambiguously mantled the Commission in Christian language... he finds it difficult to
move from the strong hierarchy of the Church to the democracy of the Commission.""8
In retrospect, therefore, one might question the legislation's stipulation that
commissioners be vetted on the basis of their political suitability and moral integrity,
without any comparable managerial litmus test. Indeed, the very vetting process for
commissioners which seemingly valued representivity over all else was a recipe for
bottlenecks on difficult policy questions. It is interesting to recall Zalaquett's advice in
this regard: "There may sometimes be a tension between ideal representativeness and
quality. One should try to have both but if this is not possible it is preferable to sacrifice
the perfect balance for the sake of quality.""9 Finally, if one accepts the frequently-
proffered excuse that, as a microcosm of broader South African society, the TRC
reflected that society's tensions and difficulties, that hardly bodes well for the future,
because it is that society which is expected to act on the TRC's work.
Finally, the TRC's operating budget was allocated as a separate line item out of the
Department of Justice's budget, as approved by Parliament on a fiscal year basis. One
might ask how this squares with Hayner's urging that, "the question of continued funding
cannot be used, or be perceived to be used, as a point of leverage to influence the
Commission's work."180 While there is no indication that government tried to leverage
the TRC's revenues for influence, the Final Report does state clearly that, "the
Commission operated under strained financial conditions virtually all the time."181 The
TRC turned to foreign and domestic donor funding to help make up the shortfall, but in
the interim, such budgetary constraints forced the TRC's to make financial compromises
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that proved costly, for example, in terms of its investigative capacity. Finally, the failure
on the part of government and Parliament to promptly authorize disbursement for
reparations also marks a missed opportunity that was costly in terms of goodwill toward
both the TRC and the government on the part of victims. The cumulative political impact
of these "administrative" problems and resulting delays should not be understated.
Wasted time and resources at the time of the Commission's start-up meant that the TRC
lost many of the benefits associated with the New South Africa's honeymoon period,
including a certain degree of momentum. With each extension of its lifespan, the TRC
came closer and closer to campaign season. Rather than being viewed as the product of
the transition, the TRC came to be viewed instead as an element of political stalemate,
and increasingly, as a tool to be manipulated to win votes. Daley addressed this dynamic:
"There were delays in getting the Commission started and several
extensions have been needed. The result is that the Commission is
finishing its work long after the euphoria of a peaceful transition has worn
thin. Instead, the report is landing just as the country is gearing up for
what promises to be a vicious and combative election year."182
6. Safeguards of the TRC: B
This benchmark encompasses two of Joinet's principles, which address a truth
Commission's protective obligations vis-a-vis victims, witnesses and perpetrators.
Victims and witnesses may be endangered and perpetrators (or alleged perpetrators) may
be implicated as the truth comes out in the course of human rights violations hearings or
the investigatory process. With regard to alleged perpetrators, Joinet stipulates both that,
in the process of establishing the truth about past abuses, the Commission should attempt
to corroborate the information it gathers, and that persons implicated in past abuses
should have the opportunity to make a statement or submit relevant documentation
setting out his or her version of the facts. "J The TRC's investigative unit, comprised of
60 local investigators and 12 specialists from foreign police services, fulfilled the
corroborative requirement, though it did not always do so in the most efficient manner or
without controversy.
The Act addressed the obligations toward implicated persons by affording them "an
opportunity to submit representations to the Commission within a specified time... or to
give evidence at a hearing of the Commission."184 Many have bemoaned the
"legalization" of the TRC process that resulted from too rigorous a protection of the
interests of perpetrators, but, to be fair, this resulted more from the legal challenges
mounted by alleged perpetrators than from the Act itself. Sarkin has pointed out,
however, that, had the Act been submitted to the Constitutional Court for abstract review
before it came into operation, the constitutional challenges could have been avoided; and
that even absent that review, the TRC could have avoided much of the costly legal
wrangling if it been more attentive to the long-term ramifications of the legal issues at
play.185 Finally, with respect to protecting perpetrators, the Act provides that, in the event
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of the Amnesty Committee's refusal to grant amnesty, "no adverse inference shall be
drawn by the court.""6
With regard to the need to protect victims and witnesses who endanger themselves in
coming forward with the truth, Joinet asserts, though without elaboration, that truth
commissions should guarantee the security and protection of witnesses and victims. " '
The TRC was the first truth commission to provide for a witness protection program
(WPP) to meet this need."8 Details of its implementation ;.ve skcichy, perhaps cut of
necessity, but it is clear that the WPP suffered as a result of the TRC's chronic funding
shortfalls. That said, over 150 individuals were able to take advantage oJ the program.
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V. Extrapolating from the TRC
The purpose of the above stock-taking exercise is two-fold. First, even a preliminary
assessment may offer significant indicators as policymakers ponder the larger question
that frames this paper. Of course, it is too early to predict with any certainty what kind of
staying power truth commissions will have for societies that are grappling with the
question of how best to deal with past human rights abuses. But, given that there are
several countries in which some variation of the idea is currently being contemplated, it is
safe to assume that new models will continue to crop up, at least in the short- to medium-
term.111'' In addition, to the extent that such mechanisms offer a viable alternative to
transitioning societies wrestling with the tough questions associated with abuse,
accountability and justice, it is hoped that post mortem assessments like the one above
can contribute to an awareness of the kinds of political obstacles such mechanisms may
be up against, and be of benefit to ongoing policy debates about how to make such bodies
more effective in the future. Just as South Africa benefited from a well-greased learning
curve on truth commissions, the paper now turns to some of the key lessons learned from
the TRC process that might be of benefit to other countries contemplating truth
commissions. Embodying this spirit of constructive criticism, Boraine commented: "We
had insights into the strengths and especially the weaknesses of other efforts. I hope
others will learn from our weaknesses, because I think we made some mistakes."'90
Ripeness
To start with, picking up on the idea of "ripeness," mentioned above, it is useful to
consider some of the aspects of the South African socio-political context that were
conducive to or positively informed the proceedings of the TRC. Without suggesting that
such factors assume sine quo non status with regard to future truth commissions, one can
nonetheless make the case that a society's ripeness for a truth commission may be
enhanced if such aspects are manifest.
• Critical Mass. One might first consider the relative balance of power between the
former apartheid regime and the former liberation movement-turned-democratically-
elected government. Clearly, "victor's justice" in the form of Nuremberg-type trials in
South Africa was not an option in the face of a threatened right-wing insurrection. But
neither would the ANC have been prepared to accept a self-amnesty on the part of the
former regime. That the TRC developed out of the process of a negotiated settlement
between former adversaries is reflected in many of the compromises that shaped the
TRC's mandate, most notably the amnesty provision in the postamble to the Interim
Constitution. That the power balance shifted over time is clear, when one looks at the
many provisions that were subsequently introduced, in particular, those that were
concerned with truth seeking and accountability, as well as reparations. Once the TRC
was operational, the dynamics continued to evolve; the upswing in party political
bickering that accompanied the NP's withdrawal from the GNU to become an opposition
party is a illustration of this point. The idea here is not to suggest that South Africa's
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political power dynamics offer a blueprint. But there is some value in considering
whether, in future power balance scenarios, there is a "critical mass" among those who
have political (and military) power who are in favor of a truth commission, will support
it, participate in it, and be willing to pay a political cost for it. On the flip side, one might
consider the availability of appropriate mechanisms to help keep in check those who
might be inclined to undermine it. Some of the following aspects that contributed to a
permissive environment in South Africa address the latter issue.
• Civil Society. Perhaps most importantly, South Africa had the advantage of a strong
civil society, whose skills were honed through many years of contesting apartheid. A
plethora of NGOs and community-based organizations had long been engaged at the
grass-roots level in activities such as investigating and compiling data to document
human rights violations; challenging the apartheid system through trie court system,
public campaigns and demonstrations, and human rights education: and providing legal
and other assistance to victims of human rights. As discussed above, many such groups
contributed to the conceptualization and indeed the legislation of the TRC, and they also
provided oversight during the TRC's lifespan. These same NGOs, and a new one, under
the leadership of former TRC Research Director Charles Villa-Vicencio, will be critical
in carrying out a watch-dog function, both monitoring the government's response to the
TRC's recommendations, and lobbying when that response is deemed to be inadequate.
That the TRC failed to take full advantage of NGO networks - particularly in the areas of
victim outreach and post-trauma counseling represents a missed opportunity which future
commissions would be well advised to remedy.
• Independent Media. Second, the existence of a strong and independent media has
been a net positive to the TRC process. The very fact of intense media scrutiny, it can be
argued, helped keep in check any fallibility on the part of the Commission. As discussed
above, public hearings created an environment conducive to the widespread media
coverage that accompanied the process. And if, as some have argued, the existence of
TV cameras at hearings is responsible for the TRC's deviation into a "Kleenex
Commission," as it was derisively called, that is perhaps one cost of the unprecedented
transparency that also contributed to public awareness of, debate about, and scrutiny of
the TRC process. This, despite the fact that the content of some of the media coverage
was slanted - the Afrikaans press, in particular, was often gratuitously vindictive toward
the TRC - and the media tended to sensationalize conflicts associated with the TRC.
Finally, while it may have been disappointing to those who support the idea of a truth
commission, it is hardly surprising that outside parties would try to use the media as a
vehicle to manipulate perceptions about the Commission, if not the Commission itself.
The existence of competing and independent media outlets might also help keep this
practice in check.
• Functioning Judicial System. In addition, South Africa came to the table with a
functioning judicial system, something that cannot be taken for granted in transitioning
societies. This had practical effect in the South African model, for example, in that the
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TRC had a pool of experienced judges from which to draw its Amnesty Committee
judges. In addition, the TRC relied on the threat of criminal prosecution in that judicial
system as an inducement for perpetrators to apply for amnesty. This is not to suggest that
the new South Africa's inherited legal system left nothing to be desired. As the Final
Report states, many in the legal profession - including many of its judges and magistrates
- were complicil in lending apartheid "the aura of legitimacy," and contributed to "the
entrenchment and defense of apartheid through the courts.""' There did exist,
nonetheless, a strong basis for the rule of law under the new dispensation. In the absence
of which, the public might not have confidence in a quasi-judicial process, such as the
amnesty process, let alone the judicial system itself, without which, the stick of
prosecution would have little credibility.
• Moral Leadership. Finally, it is worth acknowledging that, throughout this process,
South Africa has had the unparalleled advantage of Nelson Mandela's moral leadership.
The importance of this advantage should not be understated, though it would be patently
unfair to hold other societies to such a standard. Tutu has referred to Mandela as "an icon
of reconciliation.""2 Indeed, Mandela embodied the spirit of reconciliation adopted by
the TRC and articulated a vision for national unity, reconciliation, and societal
transformation.' In doing so, he set an amazing example not only for all South Africans,
but for the whole world. At the same time, South Africa was fortunate to have had
individuals with the impeccable credentials and moral authority of Archbishop Tutu and
Alex Boraine to lead TRC and set the tone for the process.
Translating Concepts in Practice
The TRC scored high marks above for its well-conceived mandate. But any commission
whose mandate includes such lofty principles as promoting "national unity and
reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of
the past..." is bound to encounter difficulty in giving those ideals practical effect."3
Because future commissions will likely face similar difficulties, it is useful to consider
briefly the TRC's experience in grappling with three such concepts.
• Justice vs. Reconciliation. Compared to either domestic or international prosecution
of the perpetrators of gross human rights violations, truth commissions - especially if
they are accompanied by an amnesty provision, are often criticized for sacrificing justice
in pursuit of truth or reconciliation. Unpalatable and morally repugnant though it may be,
this paper has accepted as a given the political compromise that resulted in the TRC's
amnesty concession. Rather than restating the moral, legal, political, and philosophical
arguments against granting amnesty that are already on record in the extensive body of
literature on the subject, or, for that matter, the arguments put forward in favor of the
strenuous truth-seeking and accountability function of the South African model, this
paper has examined some of the political ramifications that this devil's bargain has had in
South Africa.194 It is worth acknowledging, however, that the relative costs and benefits
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of justice, truth, and reconciliation have been hotly debated in South Africa and that such
questions are sure to be revisited wherever future truth commissions crop up.
In bringing a court challenge against the constitutionality of the TRC's amnesty process,
the families of Steve Biko and Griffiths Mxenge, for example, made a compelling case
against the state's right to indemnify the killers of their loved ones. Not only did the case
strike "at the heart of the Amnesty Committee's very existence," as the Final Report
commented; it represented a fundamental challenge to the TRC as a whole.!9i
Ultimately, although Constitutional Court Judge Mahomed indicated thai he sympathized
with the families' desire to see the perpetrators vigorously prosecuted and pisn.ished for
their callous and inhumane conduct, the Court upheld the constitutions!:'1/ of the amnesty
provision."6 To the extent that future truth commissions successfully rtwet the objective
benchmarks discussed above, they will be better equipped to withstand not only domestic
political and legal challenges that arise in their respective domestic contexts, they will
also be better prepared to defend their actions against opponents who may also have
recourse to extraterritorial accountability processes - whether through extradition to
another country's national courts, as in the current Pinochet case, or under the auspices of
the ICC.
• Even-Handedness. In retrospect, it is interesting to note that the word "even-handed"
is not used in the Act; clearly, however, the Commissioners concluded that it would
smack of bias if they did not hold agents of the government and members of the
liberation movements to the same objective standards of human rights. This issue was
particularly sensitive in the South African context, because of the ANC's strongly-held
belief that the struggle against apartheid constituted a "just war," a perception that was
both echoed and fueled by the international community's condemnation of apartheid as a
crime against humanity."' In addition, the ANC is the only liberation movement to have
explicitly embraced the Geneva conventions, a move which gave it considerable moral
high ground over a government that not only abrogated its duty to protect its citizens
from such abuse, but actively oppressed the majority of them. Not all liberation
movements are as conscientious as was the ANC in trying to adhere to international
norms and standards of human rights, nonetheless, the politics of even-handedness will
likely pose difficulties wherever future truth commissions are mandated to examine a past
in which atrocities have not been confined to one side of a conflict. In making the
politically-loaded judgment calls on how to handle the relative responsibility of the
different parties - whether they are government agents, paramilitaries, members of
liberation movements, or guerrillas - future commissions would do well to heed Tutu's
advice that, "it would be the height of stupidity as well as being self-defeating for the
Commission to subvert its work by being anything less than fair and even-handed.""8
• Victim-Friendly Orientation. To the extent that future commissions may want to
follow the TRC's lead in incorporating in their mandates principles for dealing with
victims, it may be also be useful to consider the pitfalls the TRC faced in realizing those
principles. First, as stated above, to the extent that there is a significant portion of the
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population that passively benefited from the policies of the former repressive regime,
future truth commissions would do well to avoid the pitfalls in focussing on victims and
perpetrators to the exclusion of beneficiaries. Second, the TRC was hamstrung by a
mandate that reserved for the government, in consultation v.iih Parliament, the power to
make final decisions and disbursement of reparations to victims, which would have
represented the most tangible evidence of the supposed victim-friendly orientation. The
reasons behind political intervention in such decisions is discussed above. One such
concern, the reluctance to create a hierarchy of victimization, is likely to be replicated in
other societies. As Van Zyl has pointed out:
"Successor regimes inevitably face a multitude of demands from
constituencies who expect their quality of life to improve under
democracy. Reparations paid to victims of gross violations of human
rights represent a diversion of resources from developmental spending on
housing, education or health care - all areas that would benefit a broader
section of society. This prioritization of a specific category of victims
over a more general group of disadvantaged citizens is more difficult to
defend when the policies of the prior regime resulted in both poverty and
human rights abuse.""'
One possible solution might be to incorporate in the reparations package a system that
would give designated victims of gross human rights violations priority in making claims
before other bodies that the successor regime might have in place to help redress the more
general poverty and basic needs issues. Such a system could incorporate a means test to
ensure that assistance to victims of gross human rights violations does not unfairly
displace assistance directed at the more generally disadvantaged.
Aside from recommending a reparations package that is apparently too generous for
politicians to swallow, one other unforeseen consequences of the TRC's victim-friendly
approach was an inclination on the part of the TRC to be generous in designating victim
status to those who came forward to make statements. Victims would not have been
eligible for any reparations without a finding that they had been subjected to a gross
human rights violation. The logical conclusion for the TRC was that when the
perpetrator of the act for which the victim is recognized as such was known, the
perpetrator would automatically be considered guilty of a gross human rights violation,
with the TRC making a finding to that effect. Thus the desire to compensate the victim -
even in a situation, for example, when a victim is caught in crossfire between guerrillas
and police forces - resulted in a finding against the perpetrator(s), in this case, those
engaged in the shooting. The ANC's objections to the substance of the Final Report
stemmed in large part from this automaticity, which resulted in many of the damning
findings against it.
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VI. Conclusion
Advocates of human rights and victims' rights and others who stand to benefit from future
truth commissions will likely study the South African model for applicable features,
while those who will be asked to financially support future commissions will doubtless
consider the extent to which the South African model provided a good return on donors'
investments and whether it is a model worthy of replication. Meanwhile, those who have
played or who will assume political roles in societies contemplating a truth commission
might be most interested in the bottom line political significance of such an exercise.
This paper has not tried to argue that the TRC offers a blueprint in any of these respects.
Rather, to the extent that the TRC represents something of a harbinger for the direction
future truth commissions - assuming they are not just a fad - might take, this paper has
attempted to examine the TRC process, and in particular some of its more politically-
controversial aspects, for potentially applicable indicators and lessons learned. Just as
South Africa benefited from a well-greased learning curve on truth commissions, the
South African model should be subjected to analysis of the dynamics at play and the way
in which they contributed to or detracted from the process and its long-term objectives.
As stated above, it would be premature to attempt to assess the end result at this stage, but
it is not too early to begin taking stock of the process and considering the potential
implications.
Praising the TRC process as "enormously successful," Constitutional Court Justice
Richard Goldstone opined that "history will judge it as a very important process."™
South Africa had unprecedented advantages which contributed to a well-crafted
commission and to that society's "ripeness" for a truth commission. To underscore the
value of the exercise, one need only contemplate the unrest, vigilantism. and/or civil war
that might have ensued in the absence of a truth and reconciliation commission.
Nonetheless, the report card above shows clear room for improvement. Some of the
disappointment with the TRC can be attributed to the unrealistic expectations that some
had of what it could achieve. Indeed, many of the TRC's problems were largely a
function of competing priorities: Different constituencies had distinct aspirations for the
commission, and they were not necessarily mutually-reinforcing. A TRC that tries to be
all things to all people will ultimately disappoint everyone.
Like most critiques of this process, this one pertains as much to the TRC's mandate and
the politicians who crafted it, as it does to the Commission itself and the socio-political
environment in which it played out. Much, of course, will depend on what South Africa
does with the recommendations put forward by the TRC. The importance of whether -
and whom - the state chooses to prosecute those who were denied amnesty or did not
even bother to apply for it will have enormous consequences, as discussed above, not
only in South Africa, but in future scenarios, as well.
A final note on the politics of the TRC: Truth commissions are not only concerned with
the past; they are just as much about the future. The South African TRC is no exception.
Given the high stakes involved, it is hardly surprising that political hay-making
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accompanied the TRC process. It will be critical, however, for those who wish to
advance to the truth and reconciliation process to work together to move beyond the
acrimony that was epitomized by the politics of the endgame. It is hoped that the post-
election political climate will be more conducive to that goal, but it is not at all clear that
the political parties have an exit strategy. It may fall, then, to non-partisan NGOs and
community-based organizations to jump-start this process. Clearly, the work has just
begun, if South Africa is to fully realize the "once in a lifetime/... longed-for tidal
wave/of justice," where "hope and history rhyme," about which Seamus Heaney so
eloquently wrote in The Cure at Troy.
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END NOTES
' The Five volume Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (subsequently
referred to as the Final Report) was handed over to President Mandela at a nationally-televised
ceremony on October 29, 1998 and was released to the public the same day. There was
widespread media coverage of the event and the last minute court challenges launched by both
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